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ABSTRACT
Progressive prosecutors have been widely hailed as the solution to mass incarceration. This Article
argues, to the contrary, that the legal arm of law enforcement can never be the full answer to its
problems. While scholars critique police and call to defund and dismantle them, they overlook
prosecutors. Building on the work of abolitionist organizers to theorize and critique progressive
prosecutors, the Article asks two key questions that scholars have left unanswered: 1) Should
the system be changed from within? and 2) Can the system be changed from within? In other
words, can reformers prosecute, and can prosecutors transform? I answer the first question with
cautious optimism, concluding that prosecutors' institutional power and ethical mandate to "do
justice" can be repurposed to start reversing decades of building the carceral state. As to whether
prosecutors can transform the system, I conclude they cannot. Transformation entails ceding
power to communities, divesting criminal system resources, and investing in societal supports
that actually keep people safe. Prosecutors' essential function to convict and punish people
cannot meaningfully achieve the dismantling of the carceral state or the buildup of alternatives.
Three pitfalls in particular impede them: exceptionalism, net-widening, and the hero complex.
This inquiry is particularly timely as the progressive prosecutor movement grows and some of the
first wave of them face reelection. Despite their rhetoric and reforms, progressive prosecutors are
not shrinking their own footprint. None are decreasing their budgets; indeed, most are asking
for more resources to "help" people. This Article demonstrates that these prosecutors are not the
magic bullet. They are at best a half-measure to achieve real change, and at worst, a "reformist
reform" which risks reentrenching and relegitimating the criminal system under new cover. I
conclude by gesturing to the limits of all lawyers in fixing the carceral monster they largely created
and calling for greater attention to grassroots, bottom-up change.
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INTRODUCTION

"Prosecution is a systemic and structural component of the criminal
punishment system. Discussions of 'good,''bad,''progressive,' or
'regressive' prosecutors keep the focus on individuals and are a
distraction that impedes the need for structural and systemic change."'
-#Defund and Defang the Manhattan DA 2

It is now widely accepted that mass incarceration must be rolled back and
that the criminal legal system operates to subjugate communities already
marginalized by race and class.3 Also widely agreed upon is the fact that
prosecutors have played a significant role in the building of the modern carceral
state. 4 The recent elections of self-described "progressive prosecutors" have
been greeted with great enthusiasm, even hailed as a possible solution.' It has
also generated a good deal of legal scholarship, most of it focused on the exciting
possibilities of prosecutorial reform.6 This optimism is understandable in our

2.

3.

CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH., COURTWATCH MA, FAMILIES FOR JUST. AS HEALING, PROJECT NIA
SURVIVED AND PUNISHED NY, ABOLITIONIST PRINCIPLES & CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES FOR
PROSECUTOR
ORGANIZING
2
(2019),
&

1.

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e1f966c45f53f25401 1b45a/t/
5e46c2744feb170e01fc09f7/1581695604941/CJEAbolitionistPrinciplesFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WSD2-YN6T].
Issue Platform and Demands for the Manhattan District Attorney, PEOPLE'S COAL. FOR
MANHATTAN DA ACCOUNTABILITY,
https://peopleforprosecutoraccountability.org/
demands [https://perma.cc/B7UE-SEVV].
For a few insightful examples of the vast overcriminalization literature, see, e.g., LOiC
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY
(2004); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2010); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME (2016);

Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054,
2054 (2017).
4.

JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO

5.

ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons From Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869-70 (2009). But
see Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 171 (2019) (arguing that
prosecutors do not have as much power as others assert they do).
See, e.g., EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2019).

6.

See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1415
(2021); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick: Progressive Law
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world of legislative "pathological politics" and largely powerless courts, and it is
borne out in these prosecutors' platforms for change on three axes: procedural,
substantive, and in relationship to their constituencies. District Attorneys (DAs)
such as Larry Krasner in Philadelphia, Rachael Rollins in Boston, Parisa Taft in
suburban Virginia, and others, have, among other things, implemented bail
reform; categorically declined to prosecute lower-level offenses, such as
shoplifting, drug possession, and trespassing; and issued unprecedented data on
racial disproportionality in the criminal system.7 Not just their policies but also
their demographics look very different from the vast majority of DAs who are
white male career prosecutors' In November 2020, a reformer, George Gascon,
was elected DA in the country's largest prosecutor office, Los Angeles, while one of
the most fast-moving progressive prosecutors, Kim Foxx of Chicago, was
reelected.' These prosecutors, however, also face rabid opposition, including
intervention from other politicians, lawsuits from their own employees, and even

&

Enforcers Then and Now, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 719, 719 (2020) [hereinafter Green
Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick]; Angela J. Davis, The Progressive Prosecutor: An
Imperativefor CriminalJustice Reform, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (2018) ("If we ever hope to fix
our broken criminal justice system, we must work to replicate [the progressive prosecutor]
model throughout the country") [hereinafter Davis, The Progressive Prosecutor]; Vida B.
Johnson, ProsecutorsWho Police thePoliceAreGoodPeople,87FORDHAM L.REV. 13,13 (2018);
David Alan Sklansky, The ProgressiveProsecutor'sHandbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE
25,25 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, The ProgressiveProsecutor'sHandbook];see also Note, The
Paradoxof "ProgressiveProsecution", 132 HARV. L. REV. 748 (2018).
See Diana Becton, Satana Deberry, Kim Gardner, Kim Foxx & Rachael Rollins, Opinion,
Prosecutors Are Not Exempt From Criticism, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2020, 12:00 PM),
politico.com/news/magazine/2020/08/25/black-prosecutors- 11 -ideas-393577
[https://perma.cc/VJZ8-VTYG].
This group of prosecutors is transparent to an
unprecedented degree about many things, including their goals and methods. See, e.g.,

7.

RACHAEL ROLLINS, SUFFOLK CNTY. DIST. ATT'Y, THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO,

8.

SUFFOLK CNTY. DIST. ATT'Y (Mar. 2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5c671e8e2727be4ad82ffle9/t/5d44a5f79807850001acc3d9/1564780028241/The+Rachael+R
ollins+Policy+Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CPG-T3YQ].
Ninety-five percent of elected chief prosecutors are white and 79 percent are white men, per a
recent study; in contrast, those identifying as progressives are much more likely to be female or
people of color. See Joe Watson, Study: 95 Percentof Elected ProsecutorsAre White, PRISON
LEGAL NEws (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2017/feb/8/study-95REFLECTIVE
[https://perma.cc/AER6-CLB7];
percent-elected-prosecutors-are-white
DEMOCRACY

9.

CAMPAIGN,

JUSTICE FOR ALL: WHO

PROSECUTES IN AMERICA?

(2015),

https://wholeads.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Justice-For-All-Report_31319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UJA9-ZY56].
Gascon's victory was in no small part due to extensive organizing by the Black Lives
Matter movement. See Sam Levin, How Black Lives Matter Reshaped the Race for Los
Angeles' Top Prosecutor, GUARDIAN
(Oct.
15, 2020,
6:00 AM)
https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/ 15/los-angeles-district-attorney-black-livesmatter [https://perma.cc/268S-5BH4].

168

69 UCLA L. REV. 164 (2022)

recall votes. 10 As the movement is growing and some of this first wave of
progressive prosecutors has been reelected, it is a particularly important time
to assess their impact, potential, and limits.
At the same time, the murder of George Floyd and long-overdue
recognition of state violence against people of color are bringing-for the first
time-widespread traction to imagining alternatives to the criminal system.
Abolitionist visionary Angela Y. Davis explained that she has never seen an
opportunity like this, "an extraordinary moment ... that rapidly shifts popular
consciousness and suddenly allows us to move in the direction of radical
change."" Scholars are interrogating the role of police.12 Some are even
concluding that the structural racism and violence endemic to law enforcement
make reforms impossible; instead, dismantling and transformation are needed.13
These calls to defund and reimagine, however, seem to skip over progressive
prosecutors who pledge to reform and "fix" the system.14 What makes prosecutors
different?
I argue here that they are not different. In making this argument, I build on
the ideas of community movements who recognize that even this new type of
prosecutor remains an arm oflaw enforcement, contributing to the carceral state.15
Structural racism, the criminalization of poverty, the system's ineffectiveness at

10.
11.

12.

13.
14.

15.

See infra note 84.
Amy Goodman, Uprising& Abolition: Angela Davis on Movement Building, "Defund the
Police" & Where We Go From Here, DEMOCRACYNOw! (June 12, 2020),
https://www.democracynow.org/2020/6/12/angela_davishistoric_moment
[https://
perma.cc/5FZF-6TNA] (interviewing Angela Davis). See also Tonya Mosley & Allison Hagan,
'An ExtraordinaryMoment' Angela Davis Says ProtestsRecognize Long Overdue Anti-Racist
Work, WBUR (June 19, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2020/ 06/19/angela-davisprotests-anti-racism [https://perma.cc/KR7V-679C] (interviewing Angela Davis).
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Disaggregatingthe PolicingFunction, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 930
(2021) ("If we truly want to achieve public safety, we need to look beyond minimizing the
harms of policing and focus on what it is exactly the police do daily, asking whether the police
are the institution best suited to the panoply of societal needs they confront regularly.").
Movement actors, however, have been making these arguments long before the summer of
2020. See, e.g., Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2020), https:// www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolishdefund-police.html [https://perma.cc/RNE5-6HG2] (discussing some of this past activism).
See, e.g., Kate Levine, PoliceProsecutionsandPunitive Instincts,98 WASH. U. L. REV. 997(2021);
Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778 (2021).
#102 Prosecution at the Crossroads, CRIM. INJUSTICE PODCAST (Apr. 16, 2019),
http://www.criminalinjusticepodcast.com/blog/2019/04/16/102-prosecution-at-thecrossroads [https://perma.cc/J2HL-V6YY].
See CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supra note 1; New Campaign: Defund Prisons. Defend
Survivors!, SURVIVED & PUNISHED (Oct. 20, 2020), https://survivedandpunished.org/
2020/10/20/defund-prisons-defend-survivors [https://perma.cc/6P99-5UCG].
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preventing injuries, and the immense harms it brings to the accused and their
families and communities are systemic features, not bugs. 16 Prosecutors are
antithetical to abolition because they maintain systems of harm, enact state
violence, and retain the power to break up families and communities; accordingly,
true transformation of the system includes the abolition of prosecutors along with
policing and other forms of state surveillance and punishment." In short,
progressive prosecutors are only the solution if they work themselves out of a job.
In this Article, I analyze prosecutors through an abolitionist lens, which
allows for a comprehension of the criminal system's history as rooted in slavery
and other forms of racialized social control. In her seminal article Abolition
Constitutionalism, Dorothy Roberts describes abolitionism as both "destructive
and ... creative," dismantling harmful, racist systems and rebuilding safer and
more equal ones. 18 An abolitionist lens also allows for the assessment of all reforms
against the horizon of dismantling the carceral state, revealing that true change is
impossible without a reimagining of how we prevent and redress interpersonal
and societal harms. 19 As Mariame Kaba explains in the context of policing, "the
onlyway that we will address oppressive policing is to abolish the police. Therefore
all of the 'reforms' that focus on strengthening the police or 'morphing' policing
into something more invisible but still as deadly should be opposed."" Similarly

16.
17.
18.

19.

20.

See infra Subpart IV.A.
See Survived & Punished NY (@survivepunishNY), TWITTER (June 30, 2020, 9:51 AM),
https://twitter.com/survivepunishny/status/1278008172339478528?s=21.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REv. 1, 43 (2019) (discussing
Du Boisian abolition democracy). I similarly use abolitionism here to mean dismantling the
carceral state, empowering communities, and building new institutions to address harm. My
definition of the carceral state includes quasi-criminal systems like the family regulation
system. I have previously applied an abolitionist lens to examine sex offenses among
juveniles, as well as the child welfare/family regulation system. See Cynthia Godsoe, #Me Too
and the Myth of the Juvenile Sex Offender, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 335 (2020) [hereinafter
Godsoe, The Myth of the Juvenile Sex Offender]; Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The
Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 173 (2017) [hereinafter Godsoe, Recasting
Vagueness] (analyzing juvenile sex offenses); Cynthia Godsoe, An Abolitionist Horizonfor
Child Welfare, L. &PoL. ECON. PROJECT BLOG (Aug. 6, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/blog/anabolitionist-horizon-for-child-welfare [https://perma.cc/AJV7-2SMF] [hereinafter Godsoe,
An Abolitionist Horizonfor Child Welfare]; see also Caitlyn Garcia & Cynthia Godsoe, Divest,
Invest, and MutualAid, 12 Colum. J. Race &L. (forthcoming 2022).
See Derecka Purnell, How I Became a Police Abolitionist, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/how-i-became-policeabolitionist/613540 [https://perma.cc/6M6B-P3LC] ("[W]e should expand restorative and
transformative processes for accountability."). For further discussion of abolitionist theory,
see infra Subpart IC.
Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Police "Reforms" You Should Always Oppose, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 7,
2014),
https://truthout.org/articles/police-reforms-you-should-always-oppose
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to Kaba's concerns about police reforms, progressive prosecutors may "smooth
out the wheels of injustice" and render less visible the institution's inherent brute
force, thus prolonging its existence.2 1 Nonetheless, abolitionist organizers also
recognize that this is a "long-term project" that will sometimes entail working with
and through state actors, albeit always keeping an eye on the end goal.2 2
Accordingly, while a number of Black Lives Matter activists have acknowledged
that "[n] o people have ever voted their way to freedom or to liberation," they have
also very effectively mobilized in recent elections, for instance, to vote out the
punitive Los Angeles DA. " As organizer Joseph Williams explained, "we also
know that during this time, we have the opportunity to do the most concrete thing
in our power to make sure that Jackie Lacey is not still our district attorney .... "24
Through this abolitionist lens, I consider two key questions that scholars,
while theorizing numerous aspects of progressive prosecution, have largely left
unanswered: (1) Should the system be changed from within? and (2) Can the
system be changed from within? In short, can reformers prosecute, and can
prosecutors transform? These questions raise issues about prosecutor and defense
attorney ethics and roles, and surface the complicity of lawyers in the broader
political economy of the criminal system.25 I answer the first question, whether
reformers should prosecute, with a cautiously optimistic yes. Historically,
prosecutors have almost exclusively interpreted justice as maximizing convictions

24.

[https://perma.cc/B3LB-GUMR] (suggesting legislation to decrease and redirect policing
funds to other social goods as one example of a proposal to support instead of policestrengthening "reforms").
Raj Jayadev & Pilar Weiss, OrganizingTowards a New Vision of Community Justice, L. & PoL.
ECON. PROJECT BLOG (May 9, 2019), https://lpeproject.org/blog/organizing-towards-a-newvision-of-community-justice [https://perma.cc/8QKZ-NM34].
Roberts, supra note 18, at 108.
Adrian Florido, Black Lives Matter Activists Push to Vote Out Los Angeles Prosecutor,NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 21, 2020, 4:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/21/ 926329248/blacklives-matter-activists-push-to-vote-out-los-angeles-prosecutor
[https://perma.cc/3KW2FKSN] (interviewing Joseph Williams, BLM organizer).
Id.

25.

See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW

21.

22.
23.

PRACTICE (1992) (critiquing the traditional regnant lawyering model as elitist and
paternalistic); see also Cynthia Godsoe, ParticipatoryDefense: Humanizing the Accused and
CedingControl to the Client, 69 MERCER L. REv. 715, 716 (2018) (examining the participatory
defense movement, which seeks to "transform the landscape of power in the court system... ,"
and arguing that public defenders are also part of the elite framework that, albeit inadvertently,
perpetuates the current system) (quoting Raj Jayadev, What is "Participatory
Defense,"ALBERT
JUST. PROJECT, https://acjusticeproject.org/about/purpose-and-practice
COBARRUBIAS
[https://perma.cc/2JRD-STAE] [hereinafter Godsoe, ParticipatoryDefense]). See also infra
Subpart IV.A.
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and punishment.2 6 Recently, some scholars, and these prosecutors themselves,
have countered that justice can be repurposed to mean ending racial disparities
and reducing mass incarceration.27 I agree. The exercise of discretion is not newjust its direction. Boston DA Rachael Rollins thus had good reason to point out the
hypocrisy of those who challenge a more lenient use of prosecutorial discretion:
"None ofyou cared about prosecutorial discretion as this train was flying 100 miles
an hour towards mass incarceration."28
As to whether prosecutors can fix the system from within, I conclude that
they cannot-not as they are currently operating. The problem is both literal-the
numbers are such that meaningful decarceration cannot occur without including
serious crimes-and conceptual. The racial hierarchy and dominant narrative of
punishment are so central to the American national identity that system actors
cannot imagine a different way to address harm.2 9 Despite their many positive
changes and some rhetoric around "transforming" the system, none of these
progressive prosecutors are actually ceding power and funding; indeed, many seek
ever more resources and influence over their communities. They do not discuss
reducing the footprint of prosecutors or, usually, the criminal system more
broadly.30 Much of their platforms' content, such as wrongful conviction
review and discovery reforms, simply raise the practice up to a floor it should
already be at or fix egregious errors of their predecessors. Other changes, like
expanding diversion programs, are "reformist reforms" that can further
entrench or expand the system rather than "unravel[ing] the net of social control
through criminalization."3 1 Even those changes that are transformative, like
eliminating cash bail or categorical declinations, are vulnerable because they are
based on discretion alone and could be summarily reversed by a new prosecutor.32

26.
27.

28.

29.
30.
31.

32.

See infra text accompanying notes 59-64, 136-137.
Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor'sEthicalDuty to EndMass Incarceration,44 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1063, 1079 (2016) [hereinafter Davis, The Prosecutor'sEthical Duty] (both by "exercis[ing]
their discretion and not pursu[ing] criminal charges in appropriate cases... [and by]
consider[ing] the broader goals of the criminal justice system [and] seek[ing] reform.... ").
Episode 10- Season 1 Finale: Obstacles to Our Movement, CHASING JUST., at 52:07 (Aug. 11,
2020),
https://www.chasingjusticepodcast.com/episodes/episode-10-overcoming-obstacles
[https://perma.cc/6S3C-BTX2].
See infra Subpart IILA.
Instead, they aim to reduce incarceration and shift the targets of prosecution. See infra Subpart
III.C.1.
RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 242 (2007) (revitalizing and defining the term 'reformist reforms').
See further discussion infra Subpart IIIB.
See infra notes 192-193 (elaborating on this problem and flagging more long-lasting reforms).
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Three challenges in particular impede prosecutors from being truly
transformational, despite their best intentions: (1) exceptionalism,33 (2) netwidening,34 and (3) the "hero" syndrome that often characterizes prosecutors (and
maybe lawyers more broadly)." This last is perhaps the most "sticky." The very
persistent-literally think of any episode of the Law & Orderfranchise-cultural
narrative of the prosecutor as "good guy" or "hero" impedes reflection about their
role in the system and obscures what most prosecutors actually do-the vast
majority of their cases are not homicides or even assaults, but rather low-level drug
and property offenses. 36 Most problematically, this narrative distracts from
systemic change efforts, analogous to how the focus on a few "bad apple" police
officers obscures structural problems.37 I do not mean to suggest that traditional
prosecutors are better or to demean the importance ofthese changes for the people
living in these communities; the impact of progressive prosecutors' reforms is real
and significant. Rather, I want to point out that well-intentioned reforms often
bring unintended long-term consequences, as could the focus on building up

33.
34.
35.

36.

37.

See infra Subpart IIL1C.1.
See infra Subpart III.C.2.
Black Lives Matter founder Patrisse Cullors recently argued persuasively that this self-image is
driving a significant amount of the near-rabid backlash against California progressive
prosecutors, noting that "yesterday's heroes may fear they are today's villains. Accepting or
adopting criminal justice reform could undermine their very sense of self." Patrisse Cullors,
Opinion, What Two CaliforniaRecall Efforts Say About CriminalJustice Reform, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 4,2021,3:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-02-04/gascon-boudinrecall-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/C53B-7M8D]. For further discussion, see
infra Subpart III.C.2.
Considering the case of a public defender who was charged for blog posts critical of DA's
offices, a group of public defenders noted that the hero complex prevents prosecutors from
evaluating their carceral role.
"People generally respect and admire prosecutors.
Historically [they] have been considered righteous protectors of vulnerable victims of crime
who could do no wrong. That time is over." Guest Columnist, Opinion, Letter: 650 Public
Defenders Stand Behind Sajid Khan, SAN JOSE INSIDE (June 23, 2020), https://
www.sanjoseinside.com/opinion/letter-650-public-defenders-stand-behind-sajid-khan
[https://perma.cc/TDB9-H9GJ]; see also infra Subpart I.A.
The response to the murder of George Floyd starkly reveals this dynamic; many are satisfied
with the prosecution of the officers who killed him, rather than looking at the bigger picture.
See Tami Abdollah, Analysis: "White America Can Keep Kicking Derek Chauvin," But What
Does It Mean for Systemic Change?, USA
TODAY
(June
25, 2021),
https://www.usatodaysun.com/analysis-white-america-can-keep-kicking-derekchauvin-but-what-does-it-mean-for-systemic-change
[https://perma.cc/GH4V-XY7S]
(pointing out that the criminal system and the Derek Chauvin trial in particular focus on
individual police officers acting badly rather than holding the system itself accountable).
Racialized police violence is not a problem we can prosecute our way out of. Seegenerally ALEX
S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING (2017) (discussing the dismantling of the police state and
implementation of noncarceral alternatives).
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prosecutorial power as the only solution to the excessive punishment and
structural racism of the criminal system.38 Progressive prosecutors are useful as a
half measure, but truly changing the system requires a great deal more.
What would further movement toward an abolitionist horizon look like? I
develop that argument throughout the four parts of this Article. I begin in Part I
by mapping the political economy of progressive prosecution, including
prosecutors' outsized role in building the carceral state, the progressive
movement's stated goals, and the backlash against them, and I finish with a brief
consideration of statist and non-statist paths to reform. In Part II, I turn to the
question of whether reformers can prosecute. Considering separation of powers
issues, legal ethics, and the day-to-day work of prosecutors, I cautiously answer
yes. As to the second, more difficult, question, whether prosecutors can truly
create change, I answer no-or at least not unless they dramatically downsize and
cede their epistemic and material power.
In Parts III and IV, I argue that truly transformative change requires
prosecutors to cede expertise and power to communities, as well as divest from
prosecutorial and other law enforcement funding while supporting investment in
truly independent community supports. 39 This entails not just listening to a
variety of voices but also giving up decisionmaking power and control."
Addressing harms outside of or far removed from the criminal system in
restorative and transformative justice programs is another way to empower
communities, particularly communities of color harshly impacted by the criminal
system; to better serve many victims; and to diminish prosecutorial power.41
Progressive prosecutors are not doing this; indeed, none have decreased their
budgets, and many have asked for more resources42 rather than redirecting
investments in their offices to other social supports, such as housing and mental

38.

39.

40.
41.
42.

For an analogous argument, see, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136
(2015) (arguing that the framing of the marriage equality movement, while a hugely important
win for many people, also reinscribed gender roles and further entrenched marriage as the only
relationship meriting state support).
See Allegra M. McLeod, PrisonAbolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REv. 1156, 116263 (2015) (describing abolitionism as entailing "fundamentally reconstructing social,
economic and political arrangements."). See also Simonson, supra note 13 (arguing that crime
policy reform ought to be driven by shifting decisionmaking power over policing institutions
to subordinated groups); but see Trevor George Gardner, By Any Means: A Philosophical
Framefor Rulemaking Reform in CriminalLaw, 130 YALE L.J.F. 798 (2021) (responding to
Simonson and countering that crime-policy reform proponents should prioritize "equitable
crime policy" over "inclusive crime policymaking.").
See infra Subpart IV.A.L
See infra Subpart IV.A.2.
See infra Subpart IV.B.1.
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health treatment.43 Reallocating resources to support communities not only
effectively addresses the root causes of most crime but also "challeng[es] the belief
that caging and controlling people makes us safe .... [B]asic necessities such as
food, shelter, and freedom are what really make our communities secure."44
I conclude by suggesting the limits of lawyers. As much as lawyers are loath
to admit it, we are not the solution to the excesses of the carceral state. The
profession is, almost by definition, focused on tradition and history, resistant to
change, and cautiously incremental when change does occur. And while legal
scholars and reformers view police and prisons as carceral institutions, we avoid
recognizing lawyers and courts as such.45 Part of this is reluctance by lawyers to
give up status and power, a reluctance that legal scholars share. Scholars also
should expand limited definitions of expertise and learn from movement actors
who are shaping law on the ground.46 Most importantly, true change necessitates
recognizing that transformation must come from the ground up, and honoring
communities' exhortations for elites to "get out of the way." The Movement for
Black Lives tells us this is essential so that "those most impacted [can] ... control
the laws, the institutions, and policies that are meant to serve [the people] ." From
this people's perspective, progressive prosecutors are at best a harm reduction stop
on the way to the fmal goal-"not co-strugglers, but targets we can push on the
path to eliminating prosecution altogether." 4

43.

44.

45.

46.
47.
48.

To be clear, this means services that are not tied to prosecutors, as diversion programs and
victims' services often are. CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supranote 1, at 2 ("Prosecutors are not
social workers, therapists, housing advocates.... They cannot and should not provide services
to people who are in need.").
About, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/about. [https://perma.cc/HJC7R2JS]; see also #8toAbolition, 8 TO ABOLITION, https://www.8toabolition.com [https://
perma.cc/3KWC-SLK7] (calling for "[a] world without prisons or police where we can all be
safe" and laying out eight steps to get there including "invest[ing] in community selfgovernance, provid[ing] safe housing for everyone," and "invest[ing] in care, not cops.").
I have been critiqued for questioning their good work. I understand the political pitfalls
involved in such an inquiry but also believe that the profession is particularly resistant to selfreflection and overestimates its role in change. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social
Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005)
(detailing how law scholars overestimate law's importance to social movements).
See Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV.
821, 846 (2021). See infranotes 337-340.
Community Control, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/
community-control [https://perma.cc/7KNN-7K6Z].
CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supranote 1, at 1.
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION

It is widely agreed that prosecutors wield tremendous, ifnot the most, power
in the criminal legal system.4 9 Using a political economy lens helps expose that
power and show how the institution of prosecution contributed significantly to the
growth and (false) legitimacy ofthe American racist carceral state.50 After detailing
this landscape, this Part describes the growing progressive prosecutor movement.
It concludes with a brief discussion of the role of the state in abolition theory.
A.

Prosecutors' Outsized Role in Building the Racist Carceral State

Historically, prosecutorial power has been a virtual one-way ratchet to
increased criminalization and punishment.
The number of prosecutors has
grown exponentially in recent decades, as have overcriminalization and mass
incarceration.52 In the post-trial world, where the vast majority of cases settle via
plea bargains, prosecutors' unilateral control of charging offenses means they are
frequently judge as well as jury.53 Given the lack of consistent checks on
prosecutors by courts or legislatures, it is not hyperbole to describe them as
"leviathans" or the "real lawmakers.""
There are also few internal checks on prosecutors. Law as a self-regulating
profession has particularly failed in this regard; despite widespread discovery and

49.

50.

51.
52.

53.

54.

See PFAFF, supranote 4. It should be noted here that there is not one criminal "system;" instead
there are many overlapping institutions and actors who do not operate in a rational, neutral
fashion. See Bernard Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy:A Genealogy and Critiqueof PublicPolicy
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2018).
See Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman,
Building a Law-and-Political-EconomyFramework:Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis,
129 YALE L.J. 1784,1820 (2020) (encouraging "[inquiry] into how law creates, reproduces, and
protects political-economic power, for whom, and with what results.") (emphasis omitted); see
also ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 85 (2003) (arguing that transforming the
system means "tak[ing] into account economic and political structures and ideologies.").
PFAFF, supranote 4.
I. Bennett Capers,AgainstProsecutors,105 CORNELL L. REv. 1561,1571 (2020) (recounting the
growth in state prosecutors nationwide from 17,000 in 1974 to 27,000 by 2001 and ongoing
growth).
See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REv. (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty
[https://perma.cc/T3VP-CQG4]; William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof CriminalLaw,
100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
Barkow, supra note 4, at 874, 885-86; Stuntz, supra note 53, at 506. To be clear, I am not
arguing that the legislature and courts have no power, but I agree with most commentators that
prosecutors have the greatest ability to quickly exercise their power and, relatedly, that
progressive prosecutors are being hailed as the solution in large part because of this power.
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other malfeasance, including many instances leading to wrongful convictions,
very few prosecutors nationwide have been sanctioned in any way." In addition to
a failure to monitor, there is also limited guidance about what prosecutors are
supposed to do. Their role has been little theorized beyond general statements about
"doing good" and what "the people" want-which never applied to all of the people
and often did not even apply to victims. This is in stark contrast to the other branch
of law enforcement, the police. 6 Aiming to gain greater clarity and to cabin the role,
scholars have recently theorized prosecutors as fiduciaries to the public, or as
servants of the law.
These frames are helpful but still do not change the
fundamental nature ofthe prosecutor's role, which is to convict and punish people.
This ambiguity and "hero" image obscure what most prosecutors actually do,
which is not what the public assumes.5 8 Most prosecutors participate in the
assembly line system of justice as social control, sometimes stacking charges to
coerce guilty pleas or (rarely) gaining convictions; they mostly prosecute minor
drug and property offenses, not homicides or even low-level assaults. 59

55.

56.
57.

58.
59.

See Bruce Green &Ellen Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialAccountability2.0,92 NOTREDAMEL. REv.
51, 51-53 (2016). Indeed, the widespread failure to hold prosecutors accountable led to my
involvement in a project to file disciplinary grievances against prosecutors found by an
appellate court to have committed misconduct. See George Joseph, Prosecutors Wrongfully
Convicted Three Men Who Spent 24 Years Behind Bars. Will They Be Disbarred?,GOTHAMIST
(May 6, 2021), https://gothamist.com/news/prosecutors-wrongfully-convicted-three-menwho-spent-24-years-behind-bars-will-they-be-disbarred [https://perma.cc/X28P-GGZZ];
see also Jonah E. Bromwich, They Publicized Prosecutors'Misconduct. The Blowback Was
Swift. N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/ 10/nyregion/queensprosecutors-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/U9SR-HXV9]; see also Editorial Board,
How Can You Destroy a Person's Life and Only Get a Slap on the Wrist?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4,
2021), https:// www.nytimes.com/2021/12/04/opinion/prosecutor-misconduct-newyork-doj.html [https://perma.cc/UC3D-AR33] (describing the status quo system as a
"prosecutor-protection racket"). For more information on the project, see It's Time to Hold
Prosecutors Accountable
#AccountabilityNY,
ACCOUNTABILITYNY,
https://
accountabilityny.org [https://perma.cc/4Z57-WQVH].
See supranotes 12-13 and accompanying text.
See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A FiduciaryTheory ofProsecution,69 AM. UNIV. L. REv.
805 (2020) [hereinafter Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory]; Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of
Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REv. 1203 (2020) (arguing that the "servant-of-the-law" paradigm
eliminates prosecutors' focus on winning and frees them to reallocate resources to more
serious crimes). See also David Alan Sklansky, The Nature andFunctionofProsecutorialPower,
106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473 (2016) (describing prosecutors' complex role as bridges
between various institutional actors and contexts in the criminal system).
See Kaba, supra note 12 (making the same argument detailed above about the false narrative
regarding the police function).
See IssA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN
AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (describing the societal discipline function of

the prosecution of lower level crimes). For one illustration of how prosecutors focus too many
resources on minor crimes, see Jessica Smith, Ross Hatton, & Christopher Tyner, Detailed
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Prosecutors also contribute to the criminalization of poverty and public health
problems, such as substance abuse and mental illness, through the prosecution of
low-level "disorder" crimes to segregate and stigmatize swaths ofthe population.60
They file thirteen million misdemeanor cases annually,61 despite recent research
that prosecuting misdemeanors increases recidivism.6 2 More broadly, this
massive churn of cases means that prosecutors inevitably perpetuate the structural
racism ofthe criminal legal system, as it dehumanizes millions ofpeople, especially
people of color who make up a disproportionate amount of those involved as both
victims and defendants. 63 Caring, or even learning about, each individual case
would grind the system to a halt.64 There is no way to avoid the racism baked
into the system, which is a particularly stark reality for prosecutors who are
people of color. Paul Butler eloquently describes this dilemma. He became a
prosecutor to address the under- and over-enforcement in Black
communities like the one where he grew up; initially "an idealist," he soon
realized what he really was doing, like his peers, was "selectively appl[ying]
criminal laws, defending the police, and locking up a lot of black people."65
Few other prosecutors acknowledge their role in perpetuating a hierarchy of
race and class.6 6 Yet the criminal system they have helped create is tremendously
costly in fiscal and human terms-dehumanizing both those harmed and those
committing harm, perpetuating racism, and entrenching whole communities in
multigenerational cycles of poverty and stigma.67 Although crime victims are

60.
61.

North CarolinaStatewide & County-Level CriminalCharging Data, UNIV. N.C. ScH. GOv'T
CRIM. L. BLOG (June 8, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.sog.unc.edu/blogs/nc-criminallaw/detailed-north-carolina-statewide-county-level-criminal-charging-data
[https://perma.cc/2WQA-GF4C].
For several examples from overcriminalization literature, see supra note 3; see also BERNARD
E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOw OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR
SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 2 (2018).

62.

Amanda Y. Agan, Jennifer L. Doleac & Anna Harvey, MisdemeanorProsecution,NAT'L. BUR.
ECON. RSCH. (Mar. 2021), https://www.nber.org/papers/w28600 [https://perma.cc/ SDD45TK5] (demonstrating the historic lack of transparency from and data about prosecution, this
ground-breaking project resulted from progressive prosecutor Rachel Rollins' consent to
opening her office's records to researchers).

63.

See ANGELA

64.
65.
66.
67.

J.

DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007)

(critiquing prosecutors for perpetuating racial disparities).
See Jenny Roberts, Crashingthe MisdemeanorSystem, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013).
Paul Butler, How Can You Prosecute Those People?, in HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE
PEOPLE? 15, 16-17 (Abbe Smith & Monroe H. Freedman eds., 2013).
See Britton-Purdy, Singh Grewal, Kapczynski & Rahman, supra note 50 (arguing that a legal
framework does so by positing the law as neutral and ignoring distributional concerns).
See supra note 3 for sources documenting the historic and ongoing function of the criminal
system to control populations, particularly those marginalized by race and class; see also NAT'L
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frequently invoked as beneficiaries of the system, it is increasingly clear that many,
ifnot most of them, are dissatisfied with the system and would prefer alternatives. 68
Yet the punitive machine continues to grow, with funding and resources
increasing over time despite the system's abysmal record of ineffectiveness at
preventing and redressing harm.69 To take just one example, federal spending
on approaches to Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) started at an already
skewed distribution of 62 percent of funding allocated to the criminal legal
system and 38 percent to social services in 1994; by 2013, the allocation to
social services was only 15 percent of the grants.70 In 2017, $266 million went
to the criminal system, with only $30 million to housing, despite significant
evidence that housing is the greatest need for survivors of IPV and that the
criminal system is ineffective at preventing IPV and other violent crime."
B.

The Progressive Prosecutor Movement

The current progressive prosecutor group differs from traditional
prosecutors in numerous ways. First, they look different. Elected chief
prosecutors are a particularly nondiverse group-95 percent are white, and 79

RsCH. COUNCIL NAT'L ACADs, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 125 (2014) (documenting the extent and racial

68.

69.

disproportionality of U.S. incarceration).
See Cynthia Godsoe, The Victim/Offender Overlap & CriminalSystem Reform, 87 BROOK. L.
REv. 1319 2022 (noting that only 41 percent of crime victims report to the police and only
eight percent of victims of violent crime receive services, often because their diverse needs and
experiences are not recognized in the system); see also Capers, supra note 52, at 1565-82
(documenting victims' dissatisfaction with the criminal system). Victims already marginalized
by race, class, gender identity, or similar characteristics are treated particularly badly by the
system. See, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, 52 HouS. L. REv. 1313 (2015)
(describing how marginalized girls are more likely to be prosecuted for prostitution than seen
as victims of trafficking and statutory rape, although they are below the age of consent and thus
are victims); Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Nota Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008) (describing how only some women "look
enough like victims" to be accorded victimhood status). Indeed, abolitionism was founded in
large part by women of color survivors of violence who found no healing or accountability
through the criminal system, and who sometimes were even punished. See Godsoe, The Myth
of the Juvenile Sex Offender, supranote 18, at 338-39 (documenting this history).
STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012). This growth includes pro
bono or volunteer law students and lawyers working at prosecutors' offices for free, despite
their existing significant government funding. See Russell M. Gold, VolunteerProsecutors,59
AM. CRIM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2022) (describing and critiquing this practice).

70.

LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY APPROACH TO

71.

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 3 (2018) (discussing Violence Against Women Act funding).
Id.
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percent are white men.72 Three fifths of the states that elect prosecutors have
never elected a Black prosecutor, as of 2014.73 Yet little notice is paid to how
unreflective elected prosecutors are of the communities they serve. As Bryan
Stevenson observes, "[in contrast to police diversity], we haven't paid much
attention to prosecutors. And that role ... has largely been occupied by white
men and [] has changed almost not at all in the last 30 years."74 In contrast, many
progressive prosecutors are people of color, with a notable number of these
leaders being Black women; some have familial experience with the criminal
system or prior professional experience as defense and civil rights attorneys.75
This picture alone alters the nature of prosecution. 76
Second, progressive prosecutors' goals and methods are different. They
seek to improve the criminal system through, for instance, fairer plea-bargaining
practices;" better allocation of resources to address the most serious crime; datadriven interventions and increased use of diversion; and greater transparency. 78

72.
73.
74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

Watson, supra note 8.
REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN, supranote 8.
All Things Considered, Report Highlights Lack of Racial Diversity Among U.S. Prosecutors,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO, at 00:59 (July 7, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/07/07/
420913863/report-highlights-lack-of-racial-diversity-among-u-s-prosecutors
[https://
perma.cc/J8K4-HSB8].
The number of women of color prosecutors increased nearly 50 percent between 2015 and
2019. Ryan J. Reilly, ElectedProsecutorsAre Still Overwhelmingly White and Male, HUFFPOST
12:00 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/elected-prosecutors(Oct. 24, 2019,
diversity_n_5dbb486e4b013fa99ad093 [https://perma.cc/B8YR-2XZS].
The cohort is also growing; one recent high-profile example is the election of Alvin Bragg in
Manhattan. See Alvin Bragg & Cynthia Godsoe, ProsecutorialDiscretion: The Prosecutor'sRole
in Curbing Infections in Prisons, ROUTE FIFTY (June 5, 2020), https://www.routefifty.com/health-human-services/2020/06/prosecutors-role-curbing-infectionsprisons/165937 [https://perma.cc/YF62-W5FS] (urging prosecutors to reenvision public
safety and incarcerate fewer defendants).
See NEW POLICIES ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 15, 2018, PHILA. DIST. ATT'Y OFF. (Feb. 15, 2018),

https://cdn.muckrock.com/outbound-composer attachments/Lucasgsl/62919/
Philadelphia-DA-Larry-Krasner-s-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH5L-UMVX].
Kim Foxx has released unprecedented amounts of data and even sponsored "hack-athons" to get feedback from the community about how to organize and share data. See
HACKING 4 JUSTICE, https://hacking4justice.org [https://perma.cc/S2F2-4BZW]; ROLLINS,
supra note 7, at 4-6; BAZELON, supra note 5; James Queally, On FirstDay as L.A. County D.A.,
George Gascon EliminatesBail, Remakes SentencingRules, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7,2020,6:51 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-12-07/in-first-day-on-job-gascon-remakesbail-sentencing-rules
[https://perma.cc/AN9T-CLEY].
One particularly significant
illustration of this transparency is the two prosecutors from North Carolina and
Massachusetts who partnered with academics to allow tracking and analysis of plea
bargains, which account for almost all cases-the "black box" of the contemporary criminal
system See Brandon L. Garrett, William Crozier, Elizabeth J. Gifford, Catherine Grodensky,
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They explicitly address the systemic racism and immense costs of the current
system and aim to redefine the conversation about community and public safety.
As Kim Foxx wrote recently about increased homicides: "To tackle violence, it is
vital that we reckon with race." 79 This cohort has already accomplished a great
deal. To take just three examples: Boudin cut the San Francisco jail population by
40 percent in his first six months in office; Rollins (mostly) ceased charging fifteen
minor offenses in Boston; 80 and Foxx, in three years, turned away more than 5000
cases that would have been prosecuted by her predecessor with no correlated
negative impact on public safety. 81 Some members of this group have even
adopted abolitionist rhetoric-Chesa Boudin recently described his philosophy of
finding other solutions than incarceration for harms to abolitionist visionary
Angela Y. Davis, and she responded that it sounded a lot like her world view.8 2
Unsurprisingly, progressive prosecutors have received tremendous pushback
from institutional actors, including police unions, federal prosecutors, judges, and
even line attorneys in their own offices. 83 Recall efforts against the Los Angeles

79.

80.
81.

82.

83.

Adele Quigley-McBride & Jennifer Teitcher, Open Prosecution, Stanford L. Rev. (forthcoming)
(detailing this project and its results).
Kim Foxx, To Tackle Violence, It Is Vital That We Reckon With Race, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Dec.
7, 2020,
4:47 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2020/12/7/22160123/kim-foxxinstitutional-racism-system-racism-chicago-violence-states-attorneys-office
[https://
perma.cc/74AJ-ZQ2Z] (noting the hugely disproportionate number of people of color among
both victims of homicide and those in the criminal system and referencing the "systemic and
institutional racism in housing, education, economic investment").
See ROLLINS, supra note 7.
Kristin Toussaint, How San Francisco'sDA Cut the City'sJailPopulation Without Jeopardizing
Public Safety, FAST Co. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/ 90558083/how-sanfranciscos-da-cut-the-citys-jail-population-without-jeopardizing-public-safety
[https://perma.cc/2626-MX3R]; ROLLINS, supra note 7, at 26; Matt Daniels, The Kim Foxx
Effect: How ProsecutionsHave Changed in Cook County, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/10/24/the-kim-foxx-effect-howprosecutions-have-changed-in-cook-county [https://perma.cc/G4E3-8DWJ] (analyzing data
released by Foxx and concluding thatthe only category of major crimes to increase under Foxx
is gun charges).
Episode 2: The Modern Civil Rights Movement, CHASING JUST. (June 19, 2020), https://
www.chasingjusticepodcast.com/episodes/episode-2 -the-modern-civil-rightsmovement [https://perma.cc/NP6D-X4LR] (interviewing Angela Davis).
See, e.g., Rory Fleming, After GOP Sweep, Virginia's AG-Elect Takes Aim at Reform
Prosecutors, FILTER (Nov. 8, 2021), https://filtermag.org/virginia-ag-republican-prosecutors
[https://perma.cc/5YRC-24JA]; Radley Balko, Opinion, Boston's First Black Woman
ProsecutorHas Yet to Take Office, but She's Already FacinganEthics Complaint,WASH. POST
(Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 2018/12/28/bostons-first-blackprosecutor-has-yet-take-office-shes-already-facing-an-ethics-complaint
[https://perma.cc/774Z-S3YT]; Caitlin Oprysko, I Am Fed Up With It' Philadelphia U.S.
Attorney Torches Local D.A. After Police Standoff, POLITICO (Aug. 15, 2019, 7:32 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/15/philadelphia-attorney-larry-krasner-police-
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and San Francisco DAs are a particularly potent threat; initiated within days of
each progressive prosecutors' election, California's recall mechanism allows for
the undoing of regular elections without the usual rules governing election
finance and the like.84
The doomsday prophesying ofthose who back the status quo is matched only
by the liberal establishment's enthusiasm. Progressive prosecutors have been
hailed as the saviors of our system who can correct decades or more of racist and
overly harsh punishment. This mindset has become so pervasive that Emily
Bazelon and other prominent commentators have urged law students concerned
about mass incarceration and racial justice to become prosecutors rather than

84.

standoff-1465394 [https://perma.cc/7DYD-6UAE]; Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate
and/or Prohibition and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ass'n of Deputy Dist.
Att'ys for L.A. Cty. v. George Gasc6n, No. 20STCP04250 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2021). India
Thusi presciently points out that the backlash against the Black female progressive
prosecutors has been particularly severe and awful: "when Black women occupy the office of
the prosecutor, there is a pervasive dislocation to the social hierarchy." See India Thusi, The
PathologicalWhiteness ofProsecution, 110 CALIF. L. REv. 101, 134 (2022).
The frequently false media coverage and huge donations by tech billionaires left San Francisco's
Boudin particularly vulnerable to recall on June 7, 2021. Megan Cassidy, These Are the UltraWealthy Donors PouringMoney Into the Chesa Boudin Recall, SF CHRONICLE (April 3, 2022),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/sf/article/chesa-boudin-recall-17052312.php
[https://perma.cc/6YY7-FNZL]. Silicon Valley tech giants and venture capitalists have been
especially critical of Boudin, even though some do not even live in San Francisco and thus are
not directly affected by Boudin's policies. See Cyrus Farivar, Why Silicon Valley Investors Are
Injecting Millions Into San Francisco's DA Recall Election, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2022),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cyrusfarivar/2022/01/28/chesa-boudin-recall-siliconvalley/?sh=7ba1eb1f6922 [https://perma.cc/SE46-YGCZ] (quoting experts noting the
"weaponization of the recall as a device" and the fact that "Chesa [Boudin] is the
unfortunate victim, the unfortunate recipient of all of the anger from the investor class and
the billionaire class."). Signatures are still needed for Gasc6n to face a recall vote, but there
is significant, and somewhat bipartisan, opposition to the Los Angeles DA, see, e.g.,
Prosecutors'AssociationOverwhelmingly Backs Recall ofLA County DistrictAttorney Gascon,
NBC L.A. (Feb. 22, 2022), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/prosecutorsassociation-recall-vote-la-county-district-attorney-george-gascon/2832727
[https://perma.cc/7AJ2-FKYT] (reporting that 83 percent of the Association of Deputy
District Attorneys, a group of over 800 deputy DAs in LA County, voted on whether to recall
their boss, Gasc6n; 97.9 percent voted in support of the recall). See also Saul Gonzalez, Recall
of LA District Attorney George Gascon Builds Steam, KCRW
(Feb. 24, 2022),
https://www.kcrw.com/news/shows/greater-la/la-da-prisoners-ca-restaurants/second-recallsupport-george-gascon [https://perma.cc/YM2Z-9RCN]; Jason McGahan, Gascon Recall Is
Being Funded By Hollywood Power Players, L.A. MAG. (Feb. 4, 2022),
https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/gascon-recall-is-being-funded-by-hollywood-powerplayers [https://perma.cc/S2QN-NYTH] (noting that while the recall drive is co-chaired by
Steve Cooley, a former very conservative Los Angeles DA, numerous wealthy Democrats have
supported it).
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public defenders. 85 And while scholars have praised, critiqued, and theorized this
movement, none have really asked the questions I address about their viability and
normative desirability through an abolitionist lens. 86 This enthusiasm for
progressive prosecutors is understandable, given the serious flaws of traditional
prosecutors, but the low bar should not stop us from asking whether prosecution
should be seen as the solution to racialized criminalization and mass incarceration.
Asking now is particularly apt timing, as the movement continues to grow and
some members from the first wave of progressive prosecutors were recently
reelected.
Despite their significant accomplishments, progressive prosecutors, I argue
below, leave much of the criminal system's political economy unchanged or even
further entrenched. The structure still prioritizes top-down expertise and
consumes more and more societal resources to address harms; the narrative
continues to be one of a 'hero' saving the community. This last point was made
very clear when Boston DA Rachael Rollins blasted defenders for claiming to be
"heroes" while failing to adequately represent "her people," that is, communities of
color, implying prosecutors were the real protectors and "saviors" of these
communities.87
C.

Abolition &the State

Abolitionism is first about asking the big questions-like, "Why prisons?"as Angela Davis famously did.88 Rather than taking the criminal system as a given,
denaturalizing assumptions of these institutions helps to assess their effectiveness
andimagine betterinstitutions.8 9 Uncovering the history ofhowthe criminal system

85.

86.
87.

88.
89.

See The Revolution in Prosecutors' Offices, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/podcasts/revolutionprosecutors-offices [https://perma.cc/MT8X-PKD8].
See supra sources discussed in note 6 for examples of this scholarship.
See Catherine Elton, The Law According to Rachael Rollins, Bos. MAG. (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2019/08/06/rachael-rollins
("One of [Rollins']
siblings has served time in federal prison on drug and weapons charges. And Rollins is candid
when talking about how another has had his own run-ins with the law, and a third has battled
an opioid addiction.").
DAVIS, supra note 50, at 9, 15 ("[T] he prison is considered an inevitable and permanent feature
of our social lives ... [but] [w]hy do we take prison for granted?").
Abolitionism is simultaneously a theory and a blueprint to guide activism, and as such it is
particularly relevant to assessing on-the-ground structural change. See, e.g., What is the PIC?
What is Abolition?, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/about/not-so-commonlanguage [https://perma.cc/CV6E-PHHK] ("Abolition is both a practical organizing tool and
a long-term goal.").
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was built reveals it to primarily prioritize social control rather than true community
safety. 90 As with the conduct we criminalize, the instruments of the penal state
should not be taken as a given. Yet while police and prisons have recently come
under intense critical scrutiny by, legal scholars have largely overlooked the role of
lawyers and judges. 91
Although sometimes derided as utopian, abolitionism is actually intensely
pragmatic, seeking to address root causes for more effective prevention of and
healing from harm. 92 It calls for responses to harm that do not rely on
incarceration, that prioritize accountability, and that provide services for both
those who harm and those who are harmed. Those who challenge it as ignoring
violence or victims thus misunderstand abolitionism's genesis and its aims.
Indeed, abolitionism was born, in many ways, out of the criminal legal system's
failure to address the needs of survivors, bringing "nothing restorative in place for
anyone ... punish[ing] and le[aving] more disaster in its wake."93 While the
model of abolition centers the needs ofthose harmed much more than the current
criminal system does, it also recognizes that to stop the cycle ofinterpersonal harm,
the needs of those who have caused harm must also be addressed. 94 Indeed, as I

90.

&

91.

Allegra M. McLeod, EnvisioningAbolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1633 (2019)
("[M]uch of the conduct that is the focus of criminal law enforcement should not be
understood as criminal at all.").
One promising counterexample is a new piece chronicling the role of criminal courts "as
systems of coercion, violence, and exploitation" in the carceral state. Matthew Clair
Amanda Woog, Courts and the Abolition Movement, 110 CALIF. L. REV. at 4 (forthcoming
2022).
See Kelly Hayes & Mariame Kaba, The Sentencing of Larry Nasser Was Not 'Transformative
Justice.' Here's Why., APPEAL (Feb. 5, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-sentencing-of-larrynassar-was-not-transformative-justice-here-s-why-a2ea323a6645
[https://
perma.cc/MGV8-46L4] (explaining that transformative justice "do[es] what criminal
punishment systems fail to do: build support and more safety for the person harmed, figure
out how the broader context was set up for this harm to happen, and how that context can be
changed so that this harm is less likely to happen again.").
Patrisse Cullors, Abolition andReparations:HistoriesofResistance, TransformativeJustice, and
Accountability, 132 HARv. L. REV. 1684,1688 (2019).
See Casper Hughes, Why PrisonShould Be Abolished, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 28, 2018,2:07 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/big-idea-prison-abolition-social-problems-domesticviolence-a8275636.html [https://perma.cc/TE2U-M63G]. Related to recognizing the
needs and humanity of those committing harm is the language we use to refer to them. I try
here to avoid use of the terms "offender" and "perpetrator," which both make assumptions of
guilt-often without proper grounds-and reduce humans to one bad act. See MATTHEW
DESMOND & GREISA MARTINEZ ROSAS, BEYOND THE EASIEST CASES: CREATING NEW
NARRATIVES
FOR
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND IMMIGRATION
REFORM
10 (2021),
https://squareonejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/CJLJ9282-Beyond-the-Easiest(describing
this
[https://perma.cc/4XDN-PSE7]
Cases-report-211206-WEB.pdf
nomenclature as "condens[ing people] from full personhood to one label: criminal").

92.

93.
94.
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argue in a recent article, there is tremendous overlap among these groups, in that
most people who cause harm have been harmed themselves. 95 Focusing on harm
reduction and transformative justice interventions rather than punitive ones, this
framework calls into question the false binary between public safety and
downsizing the criminal legal system. 96
This praxis also seeks to address structural inequality.97 The racialized
history of the criminal legal system, particularly in relation to the enslavement
of Black people, is so apparent in the current system that dismantling structural
racism plays a key role in abolitionists' mission.9 8 Overcoming inequality means
that the process as well as the outcome are important, and power-shifting is a key
component of both. Abolitionism began as a grassroots movement and remains
deeply committed to on-the-ground activism and community empowerment,
even as more scholars engage with it. 99
Although abolitionism is far from monolithic, many adherents do not seek
to eradicate all state involvement in harm prevention and redress; rather, they

95.

96.

97.
98.

99.

Criminologists refer to this as the "victim/offender overlap." Despite its salience to theories of
punishment and to effectively preventing and redressing harm, it is virtually ignored by
policymakers and legal scholars alike. See Godsoe, The Victim/Offender Overlap & Criminal
System Reform, supra note 68 (summarizing research and arguing for further scrutiny, and
even dismantling, of the problematic and inaccurate victim/offender binary).
See infraPart IV. It is important to note that we still have so far to go in dismantling the carceral
state and reenvisioning safety that-at this point-it is not productive to address how to deal
with the "dangerous few" or very small percent of those who might require incapacitation. See
M6ximo Langer, PenalAbolitionism and CriminalLaw Minimalism:Here and There, Now and
Then, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 57 (2020) (making this point in his larger comparative
discussion of abolitionist theory). Accordingly, abolitionism and criminal law minimalism
have significant overlap in my analysis.
Hayes & Kaba, supra note 92.
See e.g., Beth E. Richie, Keynote-Reimaginingthe Movement to End Gender Violence: Antiracism, PrisonAbolition, Women ofColorFeminisms,and OtherRadical Visions ofJustice, 5 U.
MIA. RACE & Soc. JUST. L. REv. 257, 262 (2015) ("To me, prison abolition represents a chance
to think about the work to end gender violence and how it needs to be refrained as work against
the patriarchal carceral state, and the architecture of racism and related forms of oppression
upon which that patriarchal carceral state is built. That is the reimagining that will be truly
radical and transformative.").
See Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba & David Stein, What Abolitionists Do, JACOBIN (Aug. 24,
2017),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/prison-abolition-reform-massincarceration [https://perma.cc/X8DD-WMDG]; see also Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj
Jayadev, Make Them Hear You: ParticipatoryDefense and the Struggle for CriminalJustice
Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2014) ("The first step of the participatory defense
movement is for people who face criminal charges, their families, and their communities to
transform themselves from service recipients to change agents."); End the Waron Black People,
MOVEMENT
FOR
BLACK
LIvEs,
https://m4bl.org/end-the-war-on-black-people
[https://perma.cc/K5VP-H33F].
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advocate for nonpunitive state involvement that would best address the root
causes of crime.
In this way, abolitionism is a positive project of envisioning a
more supportive state. As W.E.B. Du Bois first conceived of it, abolition
democracy is not only a project of dismantling unjust institutions but also a
positive one of imagining and building a more equal and just society-what
Reconstruction should have been.101 Du Bois noted that slavery was only ended in
a narrow, hyperlegal sense and that the criminal system was one of the primary
tools the state used as "a method of keeping [Black people] at work and
intimidating them." 0 2 Change would not come just from dismantling the
criminal system or ending sharecropping and other unjust labor and property
practices; these reforms must also be accompanied by equal access to education,
employment, and voting. 103 Indeed, abolition entails entirely new ways of societal
adhesion and interaction; as Allegra McLeod describes Du Bois's vision, "to be
meaningful, abolition of slavery required fundamentally reconstructing social,
economic and political arrangements."0 4
Abolition democracy is both a visionary and material project recognizing
that the buildup of the carceral state has been accompanied with, indeed driven
by, grossly insufficient spending on social welfare. 15 Contemporary movements
like Critical Resistance emphasize the importance ofmeeting basic human needs
because "communities where people have housing, food, education and jobs have
the lowest crime rates. The best way to reduce harm is by building safe, healthy
100. Those advocating for nonstate intervention sometimes propose a mutual aid model, drawing
on the rich history of marginalized groups who have engaged in this work, such as the Black
Panthers. See DEAN SPADE, MUTUAL AID: BUILDING SOLIDARITY DURING THIS CRISIS (AND THE
NEXT) (2020) ("mutual aid is the radical act of caring for each other while working to change
the world"); see also Garcia & Godsoe, supra note 18 (proposing a grassroots mutual aid model,
accompanied by a robust state-funded social safety net with no strings attached, to replace the
current quasi-criminal family regulation system).
101. W.E.B. DU BoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 165 (Routledge ed., 2017) (1935)
(arguing persuasively that formerly enslaved people built a thriving civil society and nearly
achieved a true, racially inclusive democracy, until a violent and politically powerful white
supremacist backlash resulted in the unjust Jim Crow era).
102. Id. at 451, 289 ("Abolition democracy demands for [Black people] physical freedom, civil
rights, economic opportunity and education and the right to vote, as a matter of sheer human
justice and right.").
103.

ANGELA DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: BEYOND EMPIRE, PRISONS, AND TORTURE 118-19

(2005) (" [S]lavery could not be truly abolished until people were provided with the economic
means for their subsistence. They also needed access to educational institutions and needed to
claim voting and other political rights....").
104. McLeod, supra note 39, at 1162.
105.

See DAVID SCOTT, AGAINST IMPRISONMENT: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ABOLITIONIST ESSAYS 195

(2018) ("Building a new prison is not just about putting money into the pain infliction
industry-it is also about shifting focus away from welfare support.").
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communities where people have their basic needs met."106 The United States is
particularly stingy at providing societal supports; national spending on the
carceral state far outstrips spending on societal needs like education and housing,
and government support has been racialized and stigmatized as "handouts."0 7
Indeed, a significant driver of popular support for increased policing and
prosecution in the past was the lack of social services; the government's failure
to provide such services made the criminal system the only option of state
engagement for those with family or community members experiencing
violence, mental illness, addiction, or other crises. 108 The growing popularity of
abolitionism, accelerated by the pandemic's revelation of structural inequality and
the recent reckoning with racist state violence, reveals that people are no longer
willing to accept that Hobson's choice. 109
This moment of crisis also presents an opportunity. Adopting Dorothy
Roberts's "hopeful" view, I argue here to shift the frame of what state intervention
means. Envisioning a state that is more caring, perhaps decentralized, certainly
deferential to communities, and that operates from a harm reduction or mutual
aid model frame takes us a long way from prosecution as the only way to prevent
and redress harm.1 0
II.

CAN REFORMERS PROSECUTE?

In this Part, I ask whether those committed to changing the criminal legal
system should become prosecutors. Answering this question requires looking at
the unique and highly contested prosecutorial role. I consider here three aspects
of that role: prosecutors' purported responsibility as executive branch members to

106.

What is the PIC? What is Abolition?, supranote 89.

107.

See,

e.g.,

LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF

WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994); Garcia & Godsoe, supra note 18 at notes 36-46 (documenting the
very strong connection between poverty and involvement in the family regulation systems).
108. James Forman Jr. documents this dynamic in the Black community. See JAMES FORMAN JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 12-13 (2017);

see also

Monica C. Bell, SituationalTrust: How DisadvantagedMothersReconceive Legal Cynicism, 50
LAW & SoC'Y REv. 314, 342 (2016) (reporting on her sociological research demonstrating that
"[b]ecause of the retraction of noncriminal social systems, the criminal justice system has
become one of few socially sanctioned avenues through which [low-income] mothers can
procure resources and security for their families," and also noting the possible costs and harms
accompanying this use of the police).
109. Related is the growth in popularity of mutual aid programs, which provide material support
and organizing for change. See Garcia & Godsoe, supra note 18.
110. See Godsoe, An Abolitionist Horizon for Child Welfare, supra note 18 (calling for nonpunitive
state support for families).
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"enforce the law," not make it; their unique ethical mandate as ministers of justice;
and the argument that their day-to-day function is inherently problematic, so that
"good people" cannot be prosecutors."'
I conclude that the idea that prosecutors merely enforce legislatively enacted
law is both inaccurate, especially in the current landscape of overcriminalization
and plea bargaining, and normatively wrong as a separation-of-powers matter.
Second, the ethical mandate to do "justice" actually strengthens the case for
progressive prosecutors. As to the third and most difficult question, I am
cautiously optimistic that reformers-"good people"-can be prosecutors.
Indeed, they should, as a necessary correction to the long trajectory of overly
punitive prosecutors. As I explain further below, however, the inherent nature of
prosecution means that they cannot transform the criminal system without
shrinking their own footprint and eventually "getting out of the way" of more
effective and just community interventions.
A.

Just Enforcing the Law

One of the most frequent critiques of progressive prosecutors is that they are
overstepping their role, which is merely to enforce the law, not to make it. Critics
argue that through their reform policies, particularly categorical declinations to
prosecute certain crimes, these prosecutors are violating the separation of powers.
And they do not just argue this point; they have filed lawsuits, lobbied against, and
otherwise tried to block progressive prosecutors from implementing their
reforms.1 2 Most famously, former United States Attorney General William Barr
berated these same prosecutors for "refusing to enforce" and "disrespecting" the
law. 1 3
This critique, however loud, deliberately overlooks the long history of
prosecutors making the law, mostly to grow and strengthen the carceral state, and
misunderstands the prosecutor's institutional role and democratic mandate.
Individual prosecutors shaping criminal law through their enforcement
111. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person anda GoodProsecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355
(2001).
112. Seesupranote83.
113. William P. Barr, Att'y Gen., Remarks at the GrandLodge FraternalOrder of Police's 64th
National Biennial Conference, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-grand-lodgefraternal-order-polices-64th [https://perma.cc/Q3BJ-ZZRJ]; see also Bonus: The Attack on
Elected
District Attorneys,
CRIM.
INJUSTICE
(Sept.
7,
2019),
http://
www.criminalinjusticepodcast.com/blog/2019/09/07/bonus-attack-elected-das
[https://perma.cc/2ZUK-FHTK].
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priorities is certainly not a new phenomenon. The immense sweep of criminal
law's power in any jurisdiction means prosecutors are always lawmaking by
directing resources to enforce or not enforce certain offenses.1 4 Their power to
make the laws through enforcement has only increased over time, as the vast
majority of cases today are resolved via plea bargaining; prosecutors' charging
decisions, rather than juries, often determine legal guilt and innocence. This is
particularly true of not only widely violated and more minor offenses, such as
marijuana possession, but also of homicides. 1 5
Further confirming the fact that prosecutors are not merely apolitical
enforcers ofthe law is the very active lobbying in which individual prosecutors and
state and national DA associations engage. For instance, the largest such
association, the California District Attorneys Association, insists that all of the
state's prosecutors have the same professional aims, criticizes the handful of
prosecutors who decline to be members, and has consistently lobbied against
reforms and for more punitive measures. 16 Prosecutors are often very influential
in preventing any reforms." 7 A few recent examples include blocking bail reform
and preventing the decriminalization of gravity knives in New York State and the
legislature's abrogation of the felony murder rule in California.118
Categorical declinations to enforce are also supported by prosecutors'
unique role vis-a-vis legislatures and courts in the system of checks and balances.
Experts have persuasively argued that the prosecutorial role actually requires that
11 4.

Categorical declinations to enforce criminal laws as a whole may be less successful at changing
the system than some progressive prosecutors and reformers believe, due to immense
resistance and refusal by line ADAs and police to follow the mandates of the elected top
prosecutor. See Justin Murray,ProsecutorialEnforcement and ResidualCriminalization,OHIO
STATE J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2022) (making this argument).
115. I have previously described prosecutors' discretion in statutory rape cases. See Godsoe,
Recasting Vagueness, supra note 18; see also Daniel C. Richman, Accountingfor Prosecutors,in
&

PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 40, 45-46 (Maximo Langer

David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017) ("[T]hrough the cases they take and the way they frame the
facts, American prosecutors regularly push the law beyond its initially assumed limits.").
116. Daniel Nichanian, D.A. Associations Should Own Up to the SplinteringPoliticsof Prosecution,
APPEAL (Feb. 14, 2020), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/district-attorney-associationspolitical-conflicts-cdaa [https://perma.cc/4XET-AYW9].
117. A recent empirical study of prosecutor lobbying found that it is widespread and most
commonly used to prevent funding decreases to prosecutorial offices and to block other
criminal system reforms. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ronald F. Wright, & Jessica Pishko, The
ProsecutorLobby, 79 WASH. &LEEL. REv. (forthcoming 2023) (cautioning also that the picture
is more complex, especially with progressive prosecutors breaking away from traditional
prosecutor groups).
118. Sam Mellins, Will Manhattan'sNext D.A. Break Ranks With Tough-On-Crime Colleagues?,
APPEAL (Feb. 2, 2021), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/manhattan-candidates-districtattorney-association [https://perma.cc/FD7U-Q7V3].
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prosecutors have some independence from the legislature and judiciary in order
to serve as checks on those branches. 11 9 Daniel Richman describes this connection
between prosecutorial discretion and checks and balances in both the political
economy and delegation doctrine contexts.12 Proponents of this theory point out
that prosecutorial independence or power is primarily kept in check by the
democratic process; their mandate comes from direct local election." Scholars
have supported this as a valid use of prosecutorial discretion-one arguably based
in the "localized, populist criminal law enforcement" roots ofthe American system
that was largely lost due to the disappearance of juries in a plea-bargaining
world.12 2 In stark contrast, this democratic check does not often exist for other
actors in the criminal system, such as the police, whose leadership is usually not
elected and who are treated exceptionally, thus placing them in a "democratic
vacuum" with little oversight or accountability.12 3
The new wave of progressive prosecutors demonstrates a particularly strong
case for a democratic mandate because they have been elected in a much more
transparent and contested context.12 4 Many progressive prosecutors have been
particularlytransparent during their campaigns. Rachael Rollins and Alvin Bragg,
among others, for instance, revealed detailed policy platforms during their
campaigns, including explicit detailing of the crimes they would categorically

119. See, e.g. Stephanos Bibas, The Needfor ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV.
369 (2010).
120. See Daniel C. Richman, Defining Crime, Delegating Authority-How Different Are
Administrative Crimes?, 39 YALE J. REGUL. 24 (2021) ("Prosecutorial gatekeeping ensures some
separation of power and keeps a degree of political accountability.").
121. Logan Sawyer, Reform Prosecutorsand Separation of Powers, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 603 (2020)
(arguing both that prosecutors have some independence from the legislature, contained by
separation of powers principles, and that the check on prosecutors is the democratic process,
particularly with transparency about their platforms).
122. See, e.g., W. Kerrel Murray, Populist ProsecutorialNullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 173, 180
(2021) (arguing that categorical declination is a valid use of prosecutorial discretion, based in
the "localized, populist control of criminal law" at the roots of the American system and
analogizing it to jury nullification on a "wholesale" level).
123. Anthony O'Rourke, Rick Su, & Guyora Binder, DisbandingPolice Agencies, 121 COLUM.
L. REV. 1327, 1389 (2021). Some members of law enforcement, namely sheriffs, are
elected. Matt Keyser, An Intersection of Jails, Arrests, & Mass Incarceration:Q&A With
Jessica Pishko on the Role
of Sheriffs, NAT'L P'SHIP PRETRIAL JUST.,
http://www.pretrialpartnership.org/project/an-intersection-of-jails-arrests-massincarceration-qa-with-jessica-pishko-on-the-role-of-sheriffs [https://perma.cc/47K3-C24P].
124. Carissa Hessick, Michael Morse &, Nathan Pinnell, Donating to the District Attorney, UC
DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (detailing nationwide empirical research on recent
prosecutorial elections).
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decline to prosecute.125 This is a significant departure from most prosecutorial
elections, which have centered on one or two high-profile, atypical cases and
on conviction statistics that, although easily measurable, do not reveal much
about crime prevention, accountability, or victim satisfaction. 126 Moreover, most
of the newly elected progressive prosecutors also ran as outsiders to the DA's office
and also as outsiders to the political power structure in their cities, presenting a
particularly strong case for democratic support.127 In an empirical study of
prosecutor elections, Carissa Hessick and Michael Morse found that most
prosecutorial races are not challenged, with the incumbent running unopposed,
particularly in less populous, rural districts. 12 In contrast, almost every member
of this new group ofprosecutors ran against long-entrenched incumbents and was
explicit and detailed in the planned changes for how their prosecutor's office are
managed, enhancing their democratic legitimacy.12 9
B.

Ministers of Justice

Prosecutors not only have a unique institutional function; they also serve a
singular professional role. They are the only category of attorneys with their own
ethical mandate: to be "ministers of justice." 130 Although this mandate is vague
and has historically been interpreted as carceral, I argue that it can be repurposed
to support change in the other direction. The mandate comes from prosecutors'
lack ofa concrete client and concomitant claim to represent the community or "the
people." It also references their immense power, the punishment power of the
state.131 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and other professional

125.

126.

127.

128.
129.

130.
131.

See ROLLINS, supra note 7; Alvin Bragg, Plans for DA, https://www.alvinbragg.com/plans
[https://perma.cc/RWU3-WRZ7] (describing Bragg's election platform including specifying
numerous categorical declinations).
John Pfaff, Op-Ed: The Never-Ending 'Willie Horton Effect' Is Keeping Prisons Too Fullfor
America's Good, L.A. TIMEs (May 14,2017,4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/ opinion/oped/la-oe-pfaff-why-prison-reform-isnt-working-20170514-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6GKS-MEKX] (discussing the "Willie Horton" effect).
Ronald F. Wright, Jeffrey L. Yates, & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Election Contestation and
ProgressiveProsecutors, OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2022) (analyzing data from 200
large prosecutorial districts and finding that elections became more competitive over the last
decade, including particularly the elections of progressive prosecutors).
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, PickingProsecutors,105 IOWA L. REv. 1537 (2020).
See Ronald F. Wright, Beyond ProsecutorElections, 67 SMU L. REv. 593 (2014) (concluding
after an empirical study that prosecutorial elections are not effective at holding prosecutors
accountable due to the high number of uncontested elections and partisan control).
AM. BAR ASS'N, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT r. 3.8 (2020); see also id., at r. 3.8 cmt.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing the prosecutor as "representative not
of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
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standards enumerate the many obligations this position carries, such as "ensuring
that the guilty are held accountable, that the innocent are protected from
unwarranted harm, and that the rights of all participants, particularly victims of
crime, are respected."13 2 Professional guidelines promulgated by the American
Bar Association and the National District Attorneys Association make clear that
the job extends well beyond maximizing convictions.1 33
This mandate is amorphous and rarely interrogated or enforced.13 4
Numerous professional incentives, the institutional design of the criminal legal
system, and prosecutorial immunity render the mandate quite toothless in
practice."1 3 It also leaves unanswered the question of whose justice? Although
prosecutors frequently invoke victims' names (and challengers to progressive
prosecutors continue to do so), their actions often do not comport with victims'
interests. 136 Indeed, numerous prosecutors go so far as to jailvictims who refuse to
Despite this variability and the
cooperate, particularly in family violence cases.
wide potential of interpretations under the Rorschach-like "justice" mandate,
prosecutors, judges, andthe mainstream public have-until recently-interpreted
the mandate as virtually synonymous with a narrow, tough-on-crime
perspective. 138 The failure to incorporate the views of victims and marginalized
community members who have long advocated for a more nuanced and expansive
view ofjustice reveals many prosecutors' view that "they and they alone knowwhat
justice is." 139
Although historically used to ramp up incarceration, the minister of justice
mandate can still be useful to support the reforms that progressive prosecutors are
implementing. Angela J. Davis has persuasively argued that the mandate
encompasses a prosecutor's duty to work toward ending mass incarceration, both

impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.").
132.
133.

NAT'L DIST. ATT'Ys Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1-1.1 (2009).
AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(b)

(2017).
1 34. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 57, at 820 (describing the mandate as "vague and subject to
multiple conflicting interpretations").
135. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supranote 55.
136. Based in large part on this reality, Bennett Capers has proposed privatizing prosecution, giving
victims more choice and agency. See Capers, supra note 52, at 1590-96.
137. See Leigh Goodmark, The Impact of ProsecutorialMisconduct, Overreach, and Misuse of
Discretion on Gender Violence Victims, 123 DICK. L. REv. 627 (2019).
138. See Jeffrey Bellin, The ChangingRole of the American Prosecutor, 18 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. LAw
329,331-32 (2020) (describing how prosecutors contribute to "increasing severity... and big
picture skyrocketing incarceration.").
139. Smith, supra note 111, at 378.

69 UCLA L. REV. 164 (2022)

192

by "exercis[ing] their discretion and not pursu[ing] criminal charges in
appropriate cases ... [and by] consider[ing] the broader goals of the criminal
justice system [and] seek[ing] reform."" This group of progressive prosecutors is
doing this. They are providing unprecedented data to communities and
expanding input to include those most harmed by overcriminalization.14 1 Many
of them are also declining to prosecute lesser crimes to focus their time and
resources on more serious harms.142 More broadly, they are explicitly redefining
justice. As New Orleans DA Jason Roger Williams put it: "[Prosecutors] are
ethically required to consider broader notions of the right results, the rights of
defendants and the public good... [including] understand[ing] the complicated
ways that race, and the overlapping issue of poverty, impacts the lives of

defendants.""
C.

Can True Reformers Be Prosecutors?

The third question about their role is whether a prosecutor's task is so
inherently problematic that "good" people should not undertake it. Abbe Smith
first asked this question in 2001144 and returned to in 2018, after the election of
several progressive prosecutors. She twice concluded that it is not possible,
although more recently, she expressed more hesitance and slightly less pessimism,
concluding: "I would like to believe that good, well-intentioned people who
become prosecutors could bring justice backto the criminal justice system in 2018.
But I doubt it."145 Other scholars and advocates also deem it impossible to cross
the aisle from defense or, relatedly, to be a true change agent as a prosecutor. 146

140. Davis, supra note 27, at 1079.
141. See infra notes 269-271.
142. See supra sources and text accompanying notes 66-69.
143.

TANIA TETLOW & FLOZELL DANIELS, FOR THE SAKE OF JUSTICE 38 (2021), https://

&

www.dropbox.com/s/jg727qlc8912sn/DA%20Williams%20Transition%20Report.pdf?dl=0
&fbclid=IwAR0xt7YjAEOYSop5KFPv6J2oQimqCttCvjO-U2xu-QHNiCH2OaeZ8luWAk [https://perma.cc/6ZYQ-NH5L] (also calling for prosecutors to "understand a host
of issues around sexuality, gender identity, national origin and immigration status").
144. See Smith, Can You Be a Good Personand a Good Prosecutor?,supranote 111.
145. See Abbe Smith, Good Person,Good Prosecutorin 2018, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 3 (2018).
146. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Public Defenders as Prosecutors:UnansweredQuestions, GOTHAM
GAZETTE (June 20, 2019), https://www.gothamgazette.com/columnists/ other/130opinion/8607-public-defenders-as-prosecutors-unanswered-questions
[https://perma.cc/M5RC-FAPM] (critiquing former public defenders who seek to become
prosecutors-like Queens DA candidate Tiffany Caban-by arguing that "real" defenders
"could not imagine prosecuting their clients in any way, shape, or form."). See also Maybell
Romero, Rural Spaces, Communities of Color, and the ProgressiveProsecutor,110 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2020) (noting that the extremely low bar for those deemed "progressive"
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Perhaps in an effort to address the historic underprotection of
communities of color, other experts take a less categorical approach to Smith's
question and propose that a subset of prosecutors, based largely on
prosecuting historically exempt or under-punished groups, such as the police,
corporate defendants, or exploitative landlords, can be "good people." For
instance, Vida Johnson argues this category includes prosecutors who "police
the police" and people like Parisa Taft, elected in Virginia, who campaigned to
increase the prosecution of employers engaged in wage theft of largely lowincome workers.147 Prosecutors seeking to end the harshness and inequities in
the criminal system should work to equalize the racial, class, and other
distributional aspects of the criminal legal system. Yet, as I more fully elaborate
below, simply shifting the targets of punishment without downsizing the criminal
legal system and redistributing power to people in the system cannot truly change
the system.
While recognizing the valid concerns about reforming from within, I
conclude that the prosecutorial role is not so rigid that people must fulfill it in the
same way. Indeed, many progressive prosecutors are former civil rights attorneys
or have personal familial experience with the criminal legal system. They argue
that these qualities make them particularly qualified to be prosecutors, and at least
in some respects, such as connecting with communities historically harmed and
underserved by the criminal system, they seem to be correct. 148 Accordingly, I am
cautiously optimistic that prosecutors can do good. Like Angela J. Davis, I believe
not only that it is possible, but also that the great power prosecutors wield makes
this an important step on the path to addressing overcriminalization and mass
incarceration. 149
In sum, prosecutors' institutional role and ethical mandate support the
progressive turn. Reconciling the day-to-day prosecutorial function with a larger
sense of doing good is trickier, yet still possible. In the next Part, I turn to whether
prosecutors can accomplish meaningful change and argue that, in order to be
avoid inadvertently perpetuating the current system, prosecutors must reimagine
public safety and justice. Truly transforming the system entails going beyond
reforms; indeed, mere reforms can backfire and even further entrench the status

means the term is applied to many people who are not envisioning truly transformational
change).
147. See Johnson, supra note 6. Analogously, Stephen Lee and Sameer Ashar have demonstrated
how government lawyers in the Department of Homeland Security employed prosecutorial
discretion to soften the harshness of immigration policy. See Stephen Lee & Sameer M. Ashar,
DACA, GovernmentLawyers, and the PublicInterest, 87 FORDHAML. REv. 1879 (2019).
148. See Reilly, supra note 75.
149. Davis, supra note 6.
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quo under new cover. A key part of this transformation is shrinking the criminal
system's footprint. This is where my argument diverges from that of Angela J.
Davis. Since their function is inherently punitive, prosecutors, I argue, cannot
transform the system unless they work themselves out of a job.
III.

CAN PROSECUTORS TRANSFORM?

In this Part, I argue that the transformation of the criminal system needed to
reduce harm, encourage accountability, and achieve true justice, cannot be
accomplished via reform alone. Overcoming the criminal system's racialized
societal hierarchy and dominant narrative requires deep structural change. I first
illustrate why, both numerically and conceptually, the criminal system cannot be
reformed but rather must be transformed, going well beyond the status quo to
"imagine ... and make resources that actually create well-being."" Abolitionist
theory helps illustrate why reforms without a visionary end-goal do not achieve
meaningful change in the long run. Reforms also risk legitimating an unfair system,
which can produce worse outcomes than no action. I posit three particular hurdles
that impede prosecutors from truly transformative action: exceptionalism, netwidening, and a hero complex.
A.

Criminal System Flaws Are a Feature, Not a Bug

It is by now a well-known fact that the criminal legal system is overly punitive
and perpetuates inequality."' Structural racism, the criminalization ofpoverty, the
system's ineffectiveness, and its immense harms to those accused and convicted of
crimes and their families, are a feature, not a bug. Compounding this is the
system's failure to address the root causes of crime and its inexorable creep: When
one part of the system is shut down, another pops up to replace it.152 Minor
150. Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps in Policing, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://
criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CRNoCops_reformvs_
abolition_REV2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BAU-NN3N].
151. See supra Subpart IA.
152. Ginia Bellafante, Criminal Justice Reform Empties Cells, ParoleFills Them Up Again, N.Y.
TIMEs (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/nyregion/criminal-justicereform-empties-cells-parole-fills-them-up-again.html
[https://perma.cc/
SW2UYGCW] ("Too often, former prisoners find themselves incarcerated a second or third time,
not because they have done anything particularly wrong or pose a threat to their communities,
but because they are found to have violated stringent rules that have little to do with
maintaining public well-being.").
Bill Stuntz presciently theorized an analogous
interrelationship between criminal procedure and the substantive criminal law; in the wake of
expanded defendant due process rights, jurisdictions expanded criminal laws to enable police
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reforms or even major shifts in the objects ofprosecution are not sufficient. Both
the numbers and the ideology of the criminal system substantiate this
conclusion. Perhaps most gravely, the narrative of punishment and racial
hierarchy is so strong, so central to the American national identity, that we
cannot imagine a different way of addressing harms.
Achieving a system that is more effective at preventing and redressing harm,
less costly, and more racially just, cannot happen without a massive downsizing.
As John Pfaff concludes after an extensive analysis of incarceration data: "Any
significant reduction in the US prison population is going to require states and
counties to rethink how they punish people convicted of violent crimes where
'rethink' means 'think about how to punish less.""
This need to rethink how we address harms is illustrated not only by the
numbers but also by the public discussion and policies around particularly
stigmatized crimes.154 I have previously described how the categorical exclusion of
those convicted of sex offenses-a very broadly defined term-from any criminal
system reforms hinders our ability to effectively address both sex offenses and the
excesses of the carceral state more broadly." Political scientist Marie Gottschalk
also makes this point about the famous exclusion of the majority of people in the
system (the "non, non, nons") from California's SCOTUS-mandated
decarceration: "[I]f the ultimate aim is to slash the prison and jail population,
render the criminal justice system more just, and dismantle the carceral state
without jeopardizing public safety [the political strategy of excluding violent
offenders, sex offenders, and criminal immigrants ] may ultimately be selfdefeating." 156 This focus on individual wrongdoing and pathology obscures the
powerful social drivers of crime (including, for instance, poverty and childhood

and prosecutors to arrest and charge far more people. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
153. PFAFF,supra note 4, at 136.
154. See Alice Ristroph, CriminalLaw in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 574, 593, 602
(2011) (mapping contested constructions of murder, assault, rape and domestic abuse as "one
more illustration of the contingent and contested parameters of violence"); see also DAVID
ALAN SKLANSKY, A PATTERN OF VIOLENCE: HOW THE LAW CLASSIFIES CRIMES AND WHAT IT
MEANS FOR JUSTICE 236 (2021) (describing how American law treats violence as exceptional

and punishes or rewards it in an inconsistent and highly racialized fashion so that the "category
of 'violent' crimes winds up being a legal construction, a kind of conceptual gerrymander.").
155. Godsoe, The Myth of the Juvenile Sex Offender, supra note 18.
156.

See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN

POLITICS 165 (2015) (arguing that those crimes deemed "violent" must also be included to
achieve meaningful decarceration).
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trauma) and impedes their effective prevention.157 Despite these recognitions
and growing dissatisfaction among victims, the irrational but tenacious
suggestion-including from prosecutors themselves-continues to be that to "fix"
the system, we just need more-more police, more years in prison, more
158
prosecutors.
Transformation first requires significantly shrinking the systemsomething even progressive prosecutors seem unwilling to do. Prosecutors are
also, by definition, unable to partake in the second step of building different
institutions to address harm in largely nonpunitive ways; their role in the criminal
system and their top-down message of change are at odds with creating lasting
community institutions.
B.

Reformist Reforms v. Transformative Reforms

An abolitionist horizon demands only reforms that are consistent with the
larger vision of dismantling the carceral state, rather than those that
inadvertently empower it. This is consistent with abolitionists' view that these
punitive state systems cannot be tinkered with or fixed but rather are, in fact, rather
rotten to the core. In the police context, "reformist reforms," as Ruth Wilson
Gilmore famously termed them, include measures to increase police budgets to
monitor police malfeasance, such as purchasing bodycams, as well as community
policing necessitating increased personnel.5 9 In contrast, abolitionist steps reduce
the funding and scope of policing and challenge the dominant narrative that police
increase safety. Steps that accomplish one or both of these goals include capping
overtime pay, not re-hiring police involved in excessive force, and, most of all,
decreasing police funding and prioritizing spending on other social goods such as

157.

See, e.g., PATRICK SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL OF CITY
LIFE, AND THE NEXT WAR ON VIOLENCE (2018); David Alan Sklansky, Addressing Violent

Crime More Effectively, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., (Sept. 27, 2021), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/addressing-violent-crime-moreeffectively [https://perma.cc/9DDA-ZALZ].
158. See, e.g., Frank Main, 'We're in Really, Really Uncharted Territory,'Kim Foxx Says of Gun
Violence in Chicago, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), https://chicago.suntimes.com/
politics/2020/8/7/21356372/kim-foxx-chicago-violence-gun-crime
[https://perma.cc/BAN6RKS4] (quoting Kim Foxx requesting more law enforcement resources to address violence);
see also infra Subpart IV.B.1 (discussing budgets).
159. GILMORE, supra note 31, at 242; see also Kaba, supra note 12 (providing examples of
legislative proposals to decrease and redirect police funding to other social goods).
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housing and education. 160 Below, I argue that prosecution, like policing, is often
the site of reformist reforms that impede abolitionist goals.
Indeed, reformist reforms are dangerous in that they may reentrench and
legitimate fundamentally unjust systems. By obscuring the true nature of
unjust and flawed institutions-be it the police, prosecutors, or the capitalist,
neoliberal state-reformist reforms help to reinvent and perpetuate these
institutions and concomitant hierarchies of race and class. 161 In contrast,
nonreformist reforms, as Amna Akbar describes them, "advance radical critique
and radical imagination" and are "pathways for building ever-growing organized
popular power."6 2 As such, they are bottom-up, not formulated by elites, and
directly involve struggle; indeed, the process of mobilization and struggle itself
contributes to transformation. One important caveat is due here: Eschewing
reformist reforms does not mean refusing to make things better for those in the
system while working towards the long-term abolitionist goal. Former prisoner
and now-lawyer Angel Sanchez analogizes the carceral state to cancer: "We should
fight to eradicate it but never stop treating those affected by it."163 Doing so can
sometimes seem in tension with avoiding reformist reforms, but focusing on
the long-term goal of reducing and transforming the carceral state helps
differentiate between those "treatments" that will impede the horizon and those
that will not. 164
Lawyers maybe particularly prone to the false promises of reformist reforms,
given their elitist position and reliance on the strict confines of legal procedure. 165
Lawyers working within government, such as prosecutors, are even more likely
to stymie radical movement goals, over-prioritize moderation, and

160. Reformist Reforms vs. AbolitionistSteps in Policing,supra note 150.
161. See Rachel Herzing, Let's Reduce, Not Reform, Policingin America, OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDs. (Oct.
6, 2016), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/let-s-reduce-not-reform-policingamerica [https://perma.cc/3SPC-NALN] (arguing that to abolish policing we must first
understand it "for what it is: the armed enforcement of the interests of the most powerful over
those who would challenge that power.").
162. Amna A. Akbar, Demandsfor a DemocraticPoliticalEconomy, 134 HARV. L. REv. F. 90, 104113 (2020).
163. Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite ofPrison, 132 HARv. L. REv. 1650, 1652 (2019).
164. See Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation:Economic Sanctions and StructuralReform,69 DUKE
L.J. 1529, 1534-35 (2020) (describing the utility of abolitionist theory in "measuring
reforms not against the status quo but against a fundamentally different set of goals: the
dismantling of the carceral state and its replacement with systems of 'transformative justice."').
165. See Brendan D. Roediger, Abolish Municipal Courts: A Response to Professor Natapoff, 134
HARV. L. REv. F 213, 216 (2021) ("Law is a space where even the most hardened materialism,
grounded in radical movements and mutual aid, tends to give way to
defensive ... reformism... whenever truly cornered, Law demands its own replication.").
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"conservatiz[e]" social movements. 166 Tellingly, there have been two prior
iterations of reformer prosecutors, neither ofwhich resulted in a downsizing ofthe
criminal system and both of which may even have increased prosecutorial power.
Consider the examples of turn-of-the-century Progressive reformers and the
1990s community prosecution model that accompanied the trend for community
policing.
Progressive Era reformists aimed to professionalize prosecution and
eliminate endemic corruption in the criminal system.167 They also shared with
today's progressives the situation of criminal conduct within a larger societal
context and a commitment to a data-driven approach. 168 Although the original
Progressive movement improved the criminal system in numerous ways, it also
brought many more people under punitive state control. 169 "Community
prosecution," a somewhat related, although definitely less far-reaching trend in
prosecution twenty years ago, was greeted with enthusiasm by some scholars and
advocates as a way to render prosecution more racially just and fair.1 Perhaps
well intentioned, its most prominent version quickly morphed into a project of
the conservative National District Attorneys' Association (which is actively
opposing progressive prosecutors today), and during the trend's heyday (1990s
to early 2000s), prosecutors increased their power and criminal systems across the
county ballooned." This expansion is not surprising in retrospect, since a key

166. Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 649, 687-91, 699
(2012).
167. Green & Roiphe, supra note 6, at 719,727 (describing implementation of the prosecutor model
as independent and neutral but also noting that one of the most prominent reformist
prosecutors, the Manhattan DA William Travers Jerome, drew "his power directly from the
people and won favor with the poor and the rich alike, posing a distinct threat to the entrenched
politicians.").
168. Id. at 753.
169. Id. at 731. As did the Progressive reformers in general. This was true of many groups, such as
immigrants and the working-class, and particularly true of minors and young adults from
those communities. I have previously described how "juvenile court was created in large part
to regulate and 'Americanize' low-income immigrant youth," often via placement in punitive
"reform schools." See Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness, supra note 18, at 191-95; see also Alexis
Hoag, Black on Black Representation,96 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1493 (describing the overlap between
the Progressive and eugenics movements and the resulting increase in interventions into
criminal or "deviant" behavior, usually among communities of color and/or immigrants).
170. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 321,
323 (2002) (describing prosecutors taking "nascent steps to reinvent themselves" in this
manner, although noting that it might not "flow from a [genuine] desire to be self-critical about
[their] conventional role... [so much as] an instinct to ride the contemporary tide" of
community policing).
171. For an alternative take on community prosecution and its potential to engage historically
marginalized groups, see Ronald F. Wright, Community ProsecutionandBuilding TrustAcross
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component ofthe community prosecution model is to address social problems via
the criminal system.17
Today's progressive prosecutors present the same risks of addressing social
problems via punishment, net-widening, and ultimately legitimating and
strengthening the criminal system. In short, as I elaborate further below, lawyers
are, by training and professional culture, conservative-they are not change
agents. Accordingly, by seeking change primarily through the rights-oriented
legal system, lawyers have likely narrowed the vision of possible options and
stymied real change.
C.

Three Hurdles to Real Change

I outline here three significant challenges to prosecutors trying to change the
criminal legal system: exceptionalism, net-widening, and the hero complex.
1.

Exceptionalism

Numerous scholars and advocates have defined as "progressive" those
who prosecute societally powerful groups that have historically escaped
accountability, such as those committing white-collar crime or IPV, landlords, or
the police.1m Labeling such prosecutors as progressive illustrates the trend of
exceptionalism, or arguing that prosecutors should prosecute less, except for
certain categories of crimes. This would likely positively impact some progressive
goals, such as equalizing criminal law's distributional effects and increasing public
safety for historically under-recognized victims, such as women and people of
color. Nonetheless, I argue here that no matter who is prosecuted, prosecution
cannot lead to a truly just and equal society.
The focus on prosecuting "the right people" perpetuates many of the same
pathologies found in the current approach to prosecution, such as racial
disproportionality and erasure of structural causes of harm. It also ignores the
criminal system's ineffectiveness at preventing and redressing harms, particularly
the more complex ones related to state power and economic inequality, such as
police force and intimate partner violence. In the case of police, prosecuting
individual officers perpetuates the few "bad apples" myth that overlooks the

a
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172. See Green & Roiphe, supranote 6, at 762.
173. See, e.g., BAZELON, supra note 5; Johnson, supra note 6.
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systemic and built-in violence of policing.
Individual interventions, via
prosecutions or civil suits, will continue to be more costly and less effective than
other ways to address state violence (such as reducing police). Compounding this,
are distributional costs, such as police of color being charged more frequently.1 7 4
Similarly, there is increased recognition that the criminal system does not
effectively address IPV and does not make most victims safe. As Leigh Goodmark
documents: "We have the data that shows involvement in the criminal legal system
does not deter [IPV] ... [P]olice [and prosecutors] are an [ineffective] after-thefact remedy."17 ' Despite the billions of dollars the federal government has spent on
police and prosecutor intervention, there is no proof this has decreased IPV, and
indeed, IPV homicides have risen in recent years. 176 The vast majority of these
victims do not report their abuse to law enforcement, and some-particularly
people of color and those who are otherwise not "perfect" victims-are even
prosecuted for trying to protect themselves." Nonetheless, law enforcement and
prosecutorial funding has increased with each repassage of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA); the mantra of more-more police, more prosecution-is
even being given new impetus by the progressive prosecutor movement.
Every one of the progressive prosecutors discussed here practices
exceptionalism in some form, with the two most common examples being
exceptions for police violence and for IPV/sexual assault. 178 They also mostly leave
the overinclusive group of people deemed "violent" out of many reforms, making
any significant decarceration impossible, as a significant percentage of today's
prison population are classified as "violent offenders." This exceptionalism can
lead prosecutors to ignore empirical evidence and give in to the biased, emotional
reactions that have driven criminal policy for too long. It also frequently leads
them to ignore the lived experiences of those most impacted by crime-victimsand sustains the narrative that certain people are deserving and others

174. See Levine, supra note 13.
175. GOODMARK, supra note 70, at 115.
176. Id.at116-18.
177.

See

SURVIVED

AND PUNISHED,

NO GOOD

PROSECUTORS

Now

OR EVER

(2021),

https://www.survivedandpunishedny.org/anti-prosecution/no-good-das-zine
[https://
perma.cc/H85J-RHXY] (detailing this criminalization of survival, illustrating it with case
examples, and noting that prosecutors do this while continuing to ask for increased resources
in the name of victims).
178. See, e.g., ROLLINS, supranote 7; ERIC GONZALEZ, JUSTICE 2020: AN ACTION PLAN FOR BROOKLYN
(2020), http://www.brooklynda.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Justice2020-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FT4F-AJXE].
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undeserving of punishment, perpetuating the cycle of reformist reforms.17 9 This
is not to say that there should be no individual accountability for, for instance,
police who kill people. Such individual accountability should, however, be
accompanied by an acknowledgment that the police are part of a state violence
system, as well as by efforts at systemic reform. Most importantly, the limited tools
of prosecution to do anything other than punish mean that prosecuting individual
police officers is at best an interim solution that does not further the end goal of
eliminating state-sanctioned violence.
2.

Net-widening

A perhaps unintended, but pervasive, problem with efforts to decarcerate is
net-widening, or expanding surveillance, control, and punishment of
marginalized communities. Net-widening does not just center on the criminal
system but also includes other punitive systems of state control, such as
immigration and the family regulation system. 180 Decriminalization may cause
net-widening when the state continues to regulate a decriminalized activity and
ends up sweeping into state surveillance programs those people who would never
have been criminally charged. 181 Diversion programs in particular have been cited
as increasing surveillance over those who would never have been charged
otherwise, and violations of the terms of diversion sometimes result in more jail
time than would have been served under a conviction for the underlying crime.18 2
In this manner, net-widening increases the footprint ofthe criminal system. It also
compounds racial inequality even more by drawing in more people and thus

179. See Deborah Weissman, Imperfect Progressive Reforms: Situating the Problem of Gender
Violence, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT BLOG (Sept. 30, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/
blog/imperfect-progressive-reforms-situating-the-problem-of-gender-violence
[https://
perma.cc/HV6T-M29D] (describing these results from categorically excluding gender
violence offenses from reforms).
180. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1474 (2012); Godsoe, An Abolitionist Horizon for Child Welfare,
supra note 18.
181. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1055 (2015)
(describing this in the context of marijuana decriminalization).
182. See, e.g., Stephen Handelman, How Juvenile ProbationLands More Youths in Jail, CRIME REP.
(Oct. 26, 2020), https://thecrimereport.org/2020/10/26/how-juvenile-probation-lands-moreyoung-people-in-jail [https://perma.cc/6RL5-GSPN] (documenting that, in addition to netwidening, increased use of probation likely increases the number of youths serving short jail
terms); Michael M. O'Hear, Rethinking DrugCourts:RestorativeJustice as a Response to Racial
Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 463, 481 (2009) (reporting that "sentences for failing
participants in New York City drug courts were typically two-to-five times longer than the
sentences for conventionally adjudicated defendants.").
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creating more crime in an ever-expanding cycle. 183 Racial inequality is increased
for numerous reasons, including preferential treatment of white defendants via
referrals to diversion programs (usually by prosecutors);184 higher risks of
noncompliance by certain defendants due to the lack of resources such as mental
health and substance abuse treatment in communities of color; and harsher
sanctions received by people of color for not completing programs or for violating
probation or parole conditions. 185
Part of the effort to decarcerate has been the increased use of diversion
programs. Diversion programs must be well-crafted to work at all. To effectively
address overincarceration and overcriminalization, such programs must include
those accused of serious crimes, which few do, and must always incorporate
ongoing assessment of whether a diversion program is enlarging the state
surveillance and control footprint. 186 Indeed, research shows that many diversion
programs are net-widening. 187 This is in large part because prosecutors usually

183.

Substantial research supports both these propositions: net-widening and increased racial
disproportionality. For one recent study finding both as to juveniles on probation, see ANNIE
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pose minimal risk to public safety,").
184. Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in PretrialDiversion:An Analysis of Outcomes Among
Men Charged With Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE AND JUST. 210,228 (2013)
(reporting findings from a 16-year study of pretrial diversion among men charged with
felonies and concluding that "[o]verall, prosecutors are more likely to grant pretrial
diversions to White defendants than they are to grant these diversions to Black, Latino, or
Asian and Native American defendants with similar legal characteristics"); O'Hear, supra
note 182, at 477-478 (providing evidence which suggests that white drug offenders are more
likely to benefit from this "pathway out" than Black offenders, so that diversion courts "are
apt to exacerbate, not ameliorate, overall racial disparities."); see also BESIKI LUKA
&

KUTATELADZE, REBECCA RICHARDSON DUNLEA, MELBA PEARSON, LIN LIu, RYAN MELDRUM
DON
STEMEN,
RACE
AND
PROSECUTORIAL
DIVERSION
(2021),

https://prosecutorialperformanceindicators.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/07/FIURace-and-Prosecutorial-Diversion-D.pdf [https://perma.cc/ LM86-4LLA] (demonstrating
significant racial disparities in diversion opportunities in four different counties studied).
185.

SENT'G PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL
FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 15-16, https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/

uploads/2016/01/Reducing-Racial-Disparity-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System-A-Manual-forPractitioners-and-Policymakers.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX2J-J8NG] ("A study of Wisconsin
probationers indicates that African Americans were nearly three times as likely as whites to be
revoked from probation, especially for drug offenses.").
186. See Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Models of Prosecutor-LedDiversion Programs,ANN.
REV. OF CRIMINOLOGY 331,334-35 [hereinafter Levine & Wright, DiversionPrograms].
187. See, e.g., YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUST. P'SHIP, DIVERSION FROM JUSTICE: A RIGHTS-BASED ANALYSIS
OF LOCAL 'PROSTITUTION DIVERSION PROGRAMS' AND THEIR IMPACTS ON PEOPLE IN THE SEX
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divert "low-hanging fruit"-minorcrimes that might otherwise have been quickly
dismissed. 188 In other words, rather than having their charges entirely dismissed,
people convicted of more minor offenses find themselves under state
surveillance through diversion programs. Compounding this phenomenon,
most prosecutor-run diversion programs have little transparency and
accountability. 189 In a recent survey of these programs, Ronald Wright and Kay
Levine found that prosecutors generally operated them without any legislative or
court oversight and very few peer-reviewed evaluations or rigorous assessments,
which has resulted in particularly "weak accountability."190 Many prosecutors
continue to resist restorative justice programs under any guise, especially those
that diminish any of their control. 191 This siloed corner of the criminal system
creates a significant risk of abuse because of its insularity, its lack of transparency,
and the fact that those defendants involved are even more likely to agree to all
kinds of strict conditions, and potential criminal liability if they fail, just for the
opportunity to avoid incarceration.192
The rhetoric and actions of numerous progressive prosecutors indicate that
they are particularly at risk for net-widening,; indeed, it seems to be happening
in many of their localities. Progressive prosecutors frequently speak about
diversion from court and mental health and substance abuse treatment, but
these programs remain firmly under prosecutorial control-meaning the stick
of incarceration hangs over those most vulnerable. First, the progressive
prosecution movement is primarily framed in terms of reducing mass
incarceration rather than re-envisioning the larger criminal system. Tellingly,

188.
189.
190.

191.
192.

SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES 11-18 (2018), https://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/
diversionfrom justice-ghjp_-_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ9A-JSM7] (finding lower
recidivism rates for prostitution diversion programs but also finding "coercive practices" to
induce participation, and "furtherentrench[ment]" of participants in state control); Kalani C.
Johnson, Robert C. Davis, Melissa Labriola, Michael Rempel & Warren A. Reich, An Overview
of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs: A New Incarnation of an Old Idea, 41 JUST. Sys. J. 63
(2020) (summarizing studies of diversion for several decades and noting the ever-present
possibility of net-widening).
Johnson et al., supra note 187, at 66 (prosecutors frequently let in "only the weakest cases which
could not have been successfully prosecuted.").
YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUST. P'SHIP, supra note 187, at 18 (noting that most diversion programs
are "verylocal" and "hardto monitor").
Levine & Wright, supra note 186 (finding also thatprosecutors showed selection bias and were
unclear in eligibility criteria and that the programs presented a significant risk of net-widening
and even, in some cases, a criminogenic one).
See Lara Bazelon & Bruce A. Green, Restorative Justice From Prosecutors' Perspective, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 2287 (2020).
In some instances, defendants may be diverted pre-arraignment, so may not even have been
assigned an attorney.
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the leading organization of the movement, Fair and Just Prosecution, and many
of the most openly reformist candidates, such as Chesa Boudin, describe
themselves as "decarceral" rather than more broadly anti-system or
abolitionist. 193 Second, and connected to the hero mentality discussed below,
progressive prosecutors repeatedly express a desire to solve social problems such
as mental illness, addiction, intimate partner violence, and more. For instance,
Eric Gonzalez has discussed his office's focus on rehabilitation, including
employing therapeutic professionals:
So we have pivoted in Brooklyn, but it does actually make the role of
prosecutors a little bit more complex, because we're in an area that
we're not best suited for, right? We're in an area where we're trying to
help provide rehabilitative services. That is a switch for DA's offices, so
the type of people that my office is looking to bring in now are actually
people with that kind of expertise, right? Starting to hire more social
workers and people who are licensed to do this type of work.' 94

The prosecutor's office remains an arm of the criminal system and thus is not the
appropriate actor to address these problems.
While it is admirable that Gonzalez has the humility to recognize that
lawyers, particularly prosecutors, do not have the expertise to really address
mental illness, he overlooks the fact that social workers employed by his office
are still law enforcement. Providing services to those in need "is inherently in
conflict with [prosecutors'] pledge to serve and maintain the criminal
punishment system." 195 Indeed, this mission creep to include services for
victims expands the reach of prosecutorial control, as well as renders services
less effective or completely unavailable to many survivors. 196 In contrast,
some social workers not employed by prosecutors' offices, but working
adjacent to or in coordination with law enforcement and punitive state
programs, are beginning to reject this use of their social work expertise. 197

193.

194.
195.
196.

197.

See FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, 21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR (2018),

https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FJP_21 Principles_
Interactive-w-destinations.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F3L-VBTM].
BRENNAN CTR. JUST., supranote 85.
See CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
See SURVIVED AND PUNISHED, supra note 177, at 9 (detailing this phenomenon in New York
City and noting that these nominally independent social service agencies "receive money from
carceral systems and prosecutors in their campaign for legitimacy").
See Leah A. Jacobs, Mimi E. Kim, Darren L. Whitfield, Rachel E. Gartner, Meg Panichelli,
Shanna K. Kattari, Margaret Mary Downet, Shant6 Stuart McQueen & Sarah E. Mountz,
Defund the Police: Moving Towards an Anti-CarceralSocial Work, 32 J. PROGRESSIVE HUM.
SERVS. 37 (2021).
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Hero Complex

Perhaps the stickiest hurdle to success for progressive prosecutors is the
hero role accorded to prosecutors and lawyers more generally. This trope of the
prosecutor as saving victims and protecting society continues to be very
pronounced in both public lore and legal authority. From Law and Order's
depiction of them as saviors to real-world examples like Linda Fairstein (the now
infamous Manhattan prosecutor who continues to justify her crusade against
five innocent youths in the Central Park rape case and portrays herself as a
justice-seeking "pioneer"), prosecutors posit themselves as the only barrier
between the people and violence and chaos.19' Although some prosecutors have
acknowledged the need for "humility," most do not seem to embrace its use in
practice. 199 Indeed, in a profession often characterized by hubris, prosecutors
are arguably at the top.2 00
This savior mentality obscures what the job ofmost prosecutors actually is. 2 01
It also justifies ethical shortcuts, a problem that can lead to terrible outcomes, such
as wrongful convictions. Kay Levine and Ron Wright, in interviews with
prosecutors, reveal that those who describe themselves as "the savior[s] and

198.

See, e.g., COLOR OF CHANGE HOLLYWOOD, NORMALIZING INJUSTICE: THE DANGEROUS
MISREPRESENTATIONS THAT DEFINE TELEVISION'S SCRIPTED CRIME GENRE (2020) https://

hollywood.colorofchange.org//wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Normalizing-Injustice_
Complete-Report-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8R8H-9Q5T]; Elizabeth A. Harris & Julia Jacobs,
Linda Fairstein, Once Cheered, Faces Storm After 'When They See Us', N.Y. TIMES (June 6,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/arts/television/linda-fairstein- when-they-seeus.html [https://perma.cc/SW4H-FS9Z].
199. Jackson famously stated:
A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection
against the abuse of power, and the citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who
tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who
serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task with
humility.
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor: An Address Delivered to the Second Annual
Conference of UnitedStates Attorneys, in 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 18 (1940).
200. Steve Zeidman notes that the image of prosecutors as "noble and righteous protectors of virtue
and morality" is inextricably connected to the historic rise in the prestige and size of
prosecutors' offices and the career path to judgeships and political office by so many former
prosecutors which remains very true today. See Steven Zeidman, Virtuous Prosecutors?,25
CUNY L. REv. F. 1, 2 (2022). Progressive prosecutors continue to struggle with this image;
Seattle DA Dan Satterberg recently noted his "humility" in thinking the criminal legal system
could solve societal problems-a positive development-but simultaneously lamented his
office's difficulty in hiring local law graduates since prosecutors are no longer seen by many as
the "good guys." Dan Satterberg, Seattle Dist. Att., Virtual Presentation at UNLV Law School
Prosecution Symposium (April 8, 2022).
201. See supra notes 59-64.
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protector[s] of the community" are more likely to engage in discovery
malfeasance, vilify the defense, "hav[e] blinders on," and lack an objective view of
the strength of evidence and proportionate punishment.2 02 One prosecutor they
interviewed explained that these "true believers" are "the prosecutors who tend to
get themselves in trouble ... who maybe take shortcuts, or might be tempted to put
on perjured testimony, or might be tempted to prosecute a case that they know
doesn't have merit." 2 03
Prosecutors' collective self-image leads many of them to justify their actions
on a daily basis and act against victims' wishes (albeit ironically in their names),
and it perpetuates their status as being apart from and above the community.
Accordingly, their representation of "the people" has gone mostly unquestioned,
and those most impacted by the system are ignored, their expertise overlooked,
and the costs to their community accepted as deserved. 204 Epistemic injustice
theory demonstrates the particular harms of silencing and discounting the
viewpoints and lived experiences of marginalized groups.205 Epistemic injustice
occurs when a marginalized group "is unable to contribute knowledge to public
discussions" due to its disfavored status, and the barriers to this group's
participation are deemed unproblematic. 2 06
This silencing perpetuates the societal hierarchy, with lower-income people
and people of color particularly likely to be silenced. It stifles activism and inhibits
the agency and dignity of entire groups of people. And it leads to myopic and
harmful policies, such as diversion programs that actually increase incarceration
and racial disproportionality. The vision of prosecutors as heroes representing
"the community" means that people accused of crimes and their families and
communities are categorically ignored and deemed unreliable or unworthy of
participation.
Accordingly, the prevailing, highly racialized narrative is
maintained, even ifthe line moves slightly to, for example, be more lenient towards

202. Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Images and Allusions in Prosecutors'MoralityTales, 5 VA.
J. CRIM. L. 38,44-50,56-58 (2017) [hereinafter Levine & Wright, Prosecutors'MoralityTales].
203. Id. at 58.
204. But see Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of 'The People'in CriminalProcedure,119 COLUM. L. REv.
249 (2019).
205. Eve Hanan, IncarceratedActivism During COVID-19, 18 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 475, 479
(2021) (describing the epistemic injustice of people who are incarcerated).
206. Id. at 478; see also S. Lisa Washington, Survived and Coerced:EpistemicInjustice in the Family
Regulation System, COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2022) (examining and critiquing the family
regulation system's treatment of mothers who are survivors of domestic violence).
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people convicted of drug offenses; real systemic change, redistribution of societal
resources, and the envisionment of new institutions are off the table.2 07
Although the progressive prosecution movement questions the traditional
prosecutorial image, it simultaneously reentrenches the view of prosecutors as
saviors and invigorates the cult of personality. First, progressive prosecutors
explicitly view and present themselves as "fixing" the broken system. 208 Second,
they want to hold onto the "good guy" mantle but recast it in a progressive light
based on their policies or backgrounds. Exemplifying this, Boston DA Rachael
Rollins created a public flap last year when she critiqued public defenders for
claiming to be "heroes" despite failing to adequately represent "her people," that is,
communities of color, thus implying prosecutors were the real protectors and
saviors.2 09

Ohtfrmi O. Taiw6, Being-In-The-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,
PHILOSOPHER
(Fall
2020),
https://www.thephilosopherl923.org/essay-taiwo
[https://perma.cc/ZT8K-8B9F]. The false racialized narrative that crime is about individual
"bad actors" obscures the root causes of criminal offending and perpetuates othering, and a
stark moral binary between those who harm and those who are harmed. Godsoe, The
Victim/Offender Overlap & Criminal System Reform, supra note 68 at notes 15, 121-22. A
transformational narrative-including overcoming the view of prosecutors as heroes-is
essential to meaningful change. As advocate and formerly incarcerated person, Robert
Saleem Holbrook, puts it: "narrative change always comes before social change." Interview
by Robert Saleem Holbrook with Professor Jocelyn Simonson, Brooklyn Law
School
(Aug.
2021)
https://brooklynlawschool.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/
Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=6a84labc-3228-433a-8508-ac22016040bl.
208. But at least one urges humility. See BRENNAN CTR. JUST., supra note 85 (quoting Dan
Satterberg, DA of Seattle).
209. See Andrea Estes, DistrictAttorney Rollins Calls PublicDefenders Too White and Privileged,
https://
Setting off a Storm of Protest, Bos. GLOBE (May 5, 2020),
www.bostonglobe.com/2020/05/05/metro/district-attorney-rollins-calls-publicdefenders-too-white-privileged-setting-off-firestorm-among-defense-lawyers/
[https://
perma.cc/HT3V-L9BF].
207.
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The cult of personality is also evident in how many of these prosecutors
campaign-sharing personal stories of being stopped by police,"' being abused,"
or having family members incarcerated.212 Theyuse social media and, in Boudin's
case, a podcast to describe their policies and their personal and professional
histories.213 This level of transparency and attempt to connect with a broader
community can be positive, as I argued earlier. Nonetheless, it simultaneously
entrenches the idea of the prosecutor as a change agent-perhaps the only, or at
least the primary one-thus obscuring community voices and deterring
questioning of the ongoing role of even the most progressive prosecutor in the
carceral state. (Indeed, I have had people question me on this Article's project of
critiquing progressive prosecutors, arguing that we should all be united behind
these prosecutors-an understandable concern given the alternative of traditional
prosecutors, but one that stymies debate). Finally, the savior narrative obscures
the structural reality that progressive policies can be undone by the next
prosecutor-discretion goes both ways. To truly address the deep-rooted
pathologies in the criminal system, as abolitionist organizers write: "It needs to be
seen not as an individual issue but a systemic one."21
Perhaps because of these impediments, progressive prosecutors are
mostly not implementing truly transformative changes and, as discussed
further below, are certainly not cutting funding or staff. Much of their

210. See e.g. Jonah E. Bromwich, Why Police Accountability Is PersonalforThis Manhattan D.A.
Candidate, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/12/
nyregion/alvin-bragg-manhattan-district-attorney.html [https://perma.cc/5D5Z-XQUR] ("In
seeking to position himself as the candidate most capable of changing the system from the
inside, Mr. Bragg has leaned on his personal history-including both his street-corner and
courtroom encounters with the police."); Matthew Kassel, Alvin BraggHas a Personal Reason
for
Pushing
Police
Reform,
JEWISH
INSIDER
(Feb.
3,
2021),
https://jewishinsider.com/2021/02/alvin-bragg-manhattan-da
[https://perma.cc/6KYM4F64] ("Alvin Bragg, a former federal prosecutor... was reminiscing about all the
occasions-and there are many-in which he was wrongly held at gunpoint by the
police.... Now that he is running to be Manhattan's next district attorney, Bragg believes that
such intimate interactions with the legal system... make him uniquely suited to revamp the
office amid a national reckoning over police safety and racial inequality. I'm drawing from a
place of personal and professional experience."').
211. John Chase, Foxx Parlays PersonalStory, Message of Change to Big Win, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar.
16,
2016),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-kim-foxx-cook-county-statesattorney-met-20160315-story.html ("In TV commercials and on the campaign trail, she said
that surviving a Cabrini-Green childhood, being the victim of sexual abuse in her youth and
even being homeless for a time during high school allowed her to see the county's justice system
differently.").
212. See Elton, supra note 87.
213. CHASING JUST., https://www.chasingjusticepodcast.com [https://perma.cc/6YCB-QJYP].
214.

See CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supra note 1.
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platform, such as wrongful conviction review, 215 discovery reforms (which
often entail simply complying with existing constitutional and ethical
guidelines),2 1 6 and not opposing funding parity for defenders simply raises the
practice of law to a low bar of decency.1 Others expand and entrench the
system; particularly treacherous are the programs some are implementing under a
more therapeutic veneer that still operate under prosecutorial control.2 1
The much-touted focus on data and transparency is a valuable step forward
but it is not sufficient to truly change the system. Tracking data and providing it to
the public is undoubtedly a major contribution of many in this group; Kim Foxx
in particular has provided information on charging and declination decisions to
community groups who used it to assess her performance. This neutral
assessment likely enabled voters in November 2020 to vote on her reelection with
more relevant information than in any prior prosecutorial election. 219
Nonetheless, research in other areas of criminal system reform suggest that
transparency is largely ineffective at achieving significant change, since it does not
shift decisionmaking power, and it may even deepen racial inequities and stymie
change efforts by increasing systemic legitimacy." Indeed, transparency has been

215. See,
e.g., Larry Krasner, https://krasnerforda.com/plans-for-the-future
[https://
perma.cc/V3ZD-4E2C].
216. See, e.g., Eric Gonzalez, Eric's First Term Achievements, https://www.ericgonzalez.com/policy
[https://perma.cc/5253-ZGD8]; Bragg, supra note 125.
217. Indeed, no DA actually appears to vocally support pay parity-most are not likely to actively
oppose it. One who did support it before being elected then reversed course when in office,
and asked for more funding to do his 'progressive' work. See Nick Chrastil, Now DA, Williams
Backs off on the Needfor FundingParityBetween Prosecutors,Defenders, THE LENS (Nov. 10,
2021)
https://thelensnola.org/2021/11/10/now-da-williams-backs-off-on-the-need-forfunding-parity-between-prosecutors-defenders [https://perma.cc/YA66-L4US].
218. See supra note 178 (discussing Gonzalez's use of social workers to "help" those being
prosecuted); David Greenwald, Three Prosecutors Join With Shaun King to Announce
Grassroots Law Project to Create Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Programs, DAvis VANGUARD
(July 2, 2020), https://www.davisvanguard.org/2020/07/three-prosecutors-join-with-shaunking-to-announce-grassroots-law-project-to-create-truth-justice-and-reconciliationprograms [https://perma.cc/7J3Z-4ASF].
219. See Daniels, supra note 81.
220. Two examples of this dynamic are sentencing reform and police body camera mandates, both
of which have been shown to either not produce the desired changes or even to increase mass
incarceration and inequities. See HINTON, supra note 3 (sentencing reform); Cynthia Lum,
Megan Stoltz, Christopher S. Koper, & J. Amber Scherer, Research on Body-Worn Cameras:
What We Know, What We Need to Know, 18 CRIMINOLOGY &PuB.POL'Y 93 (2019) (reviewing
and summarizing empirical research on police body cameras).
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so effective at staving off meaningful change that it has become the darling ofmany
defenders of the status quo.221
Some of these prosecutors are implementing, or trying to implement, truly
transformative reforms that may shrink the carceral power of the state, such as
abolishing money bail,22 2 banning peremptory challenges in jury selection, ceasing
use of sentencing enhancements,2 . or categorically declining to prosecute certain
crimes.224 Even those changes, however, could be reversed by a new prosecutor.
Simply put, prosecutorial discretion is inherently reformist, rather than a longterm solution. That is why numerous scholars and community groups-from a
wide range of perspectives on reform versus abolition-call for legislative change,
with progressive prosecutors' lobbying assistance, and emphasize the need to
reduce prosecutorial power.22 5 As with police, it is not that there are "good"
prosecutors and "bad" prosecutors but rather that the institution of prosecution
itself is deeply flawed. To be clear (again), I support these efforts by progressive
prosecutors but am concerned that their efforts are not accompanied by attempts
to shrink the larger criminal law footprint and are being hailed as the end goal
when they are, at best. half measures.226

221.

222.

223.

224.
225.

See David E. Pozen, Transparency'sIdeologicalDrift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 158 (2018) (mapping
transparency's move from a progressive measure to a neoliberal or libertarian measure and
concluding that transparency provides "diminishing marginal returns" and should not be
elevated over other reform demands).
Chesa Boudin has likely gone the furthest in this regard. See Jasmin Wyatt, Boudin Takes
Aim at the CriminalJustice System as SF's New DistrictAttorney, BERKELEY POL. REv. (Apr.
10,
2022),
https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2020/08/01/boudin-takes-aim-at-the-criminaljustice-system-as-sfs-new-district-attorney/ [https:// perma.cc/G2JE-FMHS].
George Gasc6n stopped using gang sentencing enhancements because they are racially
disproportionate and ineffective; despite this "embrace [of] data and reject[ion of] alarmist
rhetoric," this measure inspired the suit against Gasc6n by his employees' union. See Gil
Garcetti, Ira Reiner, and Miriam Aroni Krinsky, Opinion, George Gascon's PoliciesAre Based
in Science and Backed by Voters, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Nov. 22, 2021),
https://www.ocregister.com/2021/ 11/22/george-gascons-policies-are-based-in-scienceand-backed-by-voters/ [https://perma.cc/AP2H-YRTV].
See ROLLINS, supra note 7; Bragg, supra note 125 (outlining categorical declination platforms).
For instance, Rachel Barkow, a criminal law scholar who supports decarceration and
downsizing but not abolition, and the Community Justice Exchange, an abolitionist grassroots
movement, both call for prosecutors to support legislative change to the criminal system and
to cede their own executive powers, including limiting the scope of their discretion. Rachel E.
Barkow, Can ProsecutorsEnd Mass Incarceration?,119 MICH. L. REv. 1365, 1390-92 (2021)
(reviewing EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED (2019)); CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supra note 1.

226. These unintended consequences arise whenever there is not a long-term horizon of equality
and autonomy for all people. To take just one example, I have previously described how the
framing of the marriage equality movement, while a hugely important win for so many people,
also reinscribed gender roles and further entrenched marriage as the only relationship
meriting state support. Godsoe, supra note 38. Aya Gruber makes an analogous argument to
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BEYOND PROSECUTORS

Because of the inherent nature of the prosecutorial role, I conclude that the
only prosecutor who can transform the system is an abolitionist one. Prosecutors
cannot execute justice within the current framework because justice cannot be
done via the criminal legal system-the racism, narrative of individual blame
rather than attention to structural root causes, and reactive rather than preventive
stance-are all built into it."' In this Part, I make the normative and prudential
case that the only way for prosecutors to contribute to a transformed system is to
cede both their influence as political elites and professional experts and their
material resources.
The first part of my argument is consonant with scholars, such as Rachel
Barkow and Barry Friedman, who recommend disaggregating the police or more
broadly downsizing the criminal system. Their remedy, however, is significantly
different from my proposal; they largely call for professional experts and state
actors-legislatures and social services-as the replacement.228 In contrast, I build
on the work of movement actors and argue that the best action prosecutors can
take for people who need services "is get out of the way."22 9 Let the community self-

feminist efforts to have sexual assault and intimate partner violence recognized as harms,
which contributed to the growth of the carceral state and mass incarceration. See AYA GRUBER,
THE FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME (2020).

227. A system that addresses the root causes of crime looks very different than the current reactive
system; a key function of the former is building up the social infrastructure so that people are
safer and healthier.
See MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, Invest-Divest,
https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/invest-divest/
[https://perma.cc/5BLU-77GC] ("We
demand investments in the education, health and safety of Black people, instead of investments
in the criminalizing, caging and harming of Black people.").
228.

See

RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS

INCARCERATION 168-85 (2019) (describing the importance of engaging experts in reform
efforts, explaining how the public is guided by "emotions," and calling for "expert bodies that
use empirical data and studies to guide their decisions about criminal justice policy");
Friedman, supra note 12, at 978 (arguing that there are "realquestions" about whether police
are the right actors to do much of what they are tasked with, then suggesting that other
professionals, such as social workers, and state agencies, such as child welfare and housing,
might be better suited to these tasks); see also Bellin, supra note 57, at 1253 (concluding that the
limitations of the prosecutorial role make other elite entities "like legislators, judges, and
police" most capable of enacting significant changes). To be clear, Barkow advocates more
evidence-based and thus "pragmatic" measures in criminal system reforms and does not
suggest progressive prosecutors are the solution to overincarceration, due to the easily
reversible nature of their discretionary power. She also points out that legislative and judgemade reforms can help progressive prosecutors corral or compel their line prosecutors to
implement their policies. Barkow, supra note 225, at 1392.
229. See CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supra note 1. Research shows that most of the people who
harm and are harmed, usually designated 'offenders' and 'victims,' lack meaningful access to

212

69 UCLA L. REV. 164 (2022)

defend and build their own new institutions and a new vision of safety, from the
ground up.2 30
Sociologist Patrick Sharkey's research demonstrates that building up
community resources and social infrastructure, such as local non-profits, can
address even violent crime "at least as effective [ly] as the police" and with far fewer
costs; accordingly, he calls for "investments in a alternative set ofinstitutions [than
law enforcement and the criminal system] driven by residents and local
organizations that can play a central role in creating safe streets and strong
communities."' Positing the community as a primary source of expertise and
change implicates the ongoing debate in criminal system reform between
increased expertise and increased democratic engagement.232 While recognizing
that "the community" has traditionally skewed in favor of increasing
punishment, as Rachel Barkow aptly documents, I do not agree that the remedy,
at least in the case of prosecutors, is to eschew the community's expertise and

services such as health care, substance abuse treatment, education, and employment assistance.

See Godsoe, The Victim/Offender Overlap & Criminal System Reform, supra note 68
230.

(summarizing research).
I use community self-defense here to mean the concept that "we keep us safe;" true public
safety comes from support systems for families and communities, who work together against
violence and other harms through restorative justice approaches and investments in resources
such as healthcare and housing, education and living-wage jobs, rather than through top-down
carceral interventions. As one community-based organization puts it, "[T]oo often, public
safety is seen as an individual issue when it is actually a community issue. We all have
something to gain by investing in community-based solutions that genuinely create safe and
secure communities." ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., PUBLIC SAFETY BEGINS WITH PUBLIC
HEALTH: MAKING OAKLAND SAFER TOGETHER 4 (2017), https://slidelegend.com/public-

safety-begins-with-public-health-ella-baker-center_5ad9c09f7f8b9ad5018b4585.htm
[https://perma.cc/64WV-K9VT]; see also RISE & TAKEROOT JUST., AN UNAVOIDABLE SYSTEM:
THE HARMS OF FAMILY POLICING AND PARENTS' VISION FOR INVESTING IN COMMUNITY CARE

(2021),
https://www.risemagazine.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/AnUnavoidableSystem.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LUZ4-PHQ2]
(detailing, in the family regulation context, how families and communities know far better than
the state how to best care for their children).
231. Roge Karma, How Cities Can Tackle Violent Crime Without Relying on Police, Vox (Aug. 7,
2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/21351442/patrick-sharkey-uneasy-peace-abolishdefund-the-police-violence-cities [https://perma.cc/E52X-V85T]. See further discussion infra
notes 326-331.
232. I cite here just a few of the many scholars discussing this important issue. Compare BARKOW,
supra note 228; John Rappaport, Some Doubts About "Democratizing"CriminalJustice, 87 U.
CHI. L. REV. 711, 810 (collecting studies showing that laypeople can be punitive and arguing for
reform that "emphasizes an evidence-based approach to criminal justice problem-solving
focused on achieving outcomes consistent with democratic values"); with Akbar, supra note
162 (calling for "non-reformist reforms," or changes that empowers communities rather than
those made by elites); Simonson, supra note 13 (calling for powershifting to grassroots
movements from elites).
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democratic voice in favor of experts "knowing better," thereby increasing the
(already large) influence of professionals.
State prosecutors are expressly political and almost always directly elected.
Accordingly, they cannot profess to neutrality as experts, and they also have a
greater democratic mandate than most other system actors.233 This latter point
softens the either/or choice of egalitarian process versus outcomes that Trevor
Gardner points out-DAs are chosen by an egalitarian process (as much as one
considers our elections egalitarian), so reformers can focus on those candidates
advocating the most egalitarian outcomes.2 34 Indeed, the recent elections of
progressive prosecutors may indicate that penal populism has in part been based
on a lack of information about the criminal system and prosecutorial actions, as
well as a dearth of other options in struggling communities. 25 Perhaps the greater
transparency of criminal system actors exemplified by this group of prosecutors,
coupled with increased community attention to the system's pathologies, will
result in more informed and less punitive choices. 236 Moreover, the growing body
of evidence from restorative justice programs suggests that "on the individual
level, mercy may have purchase."3 As to the question of expertise, prosecutors
have historically used neither empirically-proven interventions nor community
experiences to shape their policies. Accordingly, the choice between bottom-up
or top-down inputs is also not necessarily an either/or. Expanding both those
inputs, as progressive prosecutors are doing, will only benefit their
decisionmaking.
Despite these positive signs, however, progressive prosecutors can only take
us so far. Long-term change cannot come unless they shrink their own

233. I agree with Ben Levin that neutrality is likely impossible and that experts professing to be
neutral may be more problematic than those making their political priorities clear. See
Benjamin Levin, De-Democratizing Criminal Law, 39 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 74, 84-85 (2020); see
also, supra notes 120-126 (discussing prosecutors' democratic mandate). I, with two
coauthors, make the same argument as to legal scholars in a forthcoming piece. Cynthia
Godsoe, Abbe Smith & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Can You Be A Legal Ethics Scholarand Have Guts?,
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2022), at nn.119-36 (also noting the false neutrality
narrative in the fields of journalism and history).
234. Gardner, supra note 39.
235. See FORMAN, supra note 108 (arguing in part that communities supported punitive measures
due to a lack of other options). Rachel Barkow seems to agree, suggesting that their election
may indicate that, at a local level, voters are betterable to assess "actual crime rates and practices
and how they affect their lives and communities." Barkow, supra note 225, at 155.
236. It is true that progressive prosecutors remain a very small minority of elected prosecutors. Given
their high profile, however, it is certainly possible that their reforms can influence, even in a
small way, jurisdictions that do not go so far as to elect one.
237. Capers, supra note 52, at 1598.
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footprint.2 38 Unfortunately, this is not happening. While some prosecutors in this
new movement are further involving the community in advising their platforms,
none are ceding funding, and most are seeking expanded resources to implement
their platforms and grow their influence.
A.

Shifting Power From Professionals to Communities

Although defense and prosecution are presented as a binary, the
progressive prosecution movement, with its decarceral mission and crossover
defender personnel, reveals similarities between the two-something long known
to the people involved in the system. There is no doubt all lawyers are insiders in a
system that others and dehumanizes people accused of crimes (and often victims
as well). Attorneys on either the prosecution or defense side are more highly
educated, have higher incomes, are more likely to be white, and are less likely to
have a disability or mental illness than people involved in the system. 239 They also
usually have little-to-no personal experience with the criminal legal system, and
their cultural and political hegemony remain largely unchallenged." Recall the
Rachel Rollins flap, where it became clear that both prosecutors and defenders are
far less demographically diverse than, and often also out of touch with, the
communities they serve.
By training and professional culture, lawyers are more elite and usually
more conservative than other movement actors."" Gerald L6pez recognized

238. Lawyers and law itself are not accustomed to taking a backseat and deferring to others, though
they should do so much more. Roediger, supra note 165, at 216 ("Law hears 'abolitionist
alternative' and imagines a new apparatus, similar in form, ready for co-optation").
239. See Hoag, supra note 169, at nn.18-20 (detailing statistics). Prosecutors, as particularly
powerful and valorized lawyers skew even whiter and maler than other attorneys, see supra
notes 74-75, and their power may be so racialized and gendered as to render Black women
elected head prosecutors particularly harassed and criticized by many. See Thusi, supra note
83, at 133-37 (arguing persuasively that the "racialized attacks and disadvantages" on Kim
Foxx, Kim Gardner and others, stem from this bias that they are deemed "inadequate ... to
reap all the privileges available to white prosecutors").
240. Some legal scholars and lawyers are starting to question this hegemony. See, e.g., JONATHAN
RAPPING, GIDEON'S PROMISE: A PUBLIC DEFENDER MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (2020); see also Letter: 650 Public Defenders Stand Behind Sajid Khan, supra note 36
(calling for "[a]ll of us who work in the criminal legal system, including public defenders, [to]
at the very least be willing to examine the roles we play in perpetuating systemic injustices.");
Hoag, supra note 169; Shaun Ossei-Owusu, The Sixth Amendment Fagade: The Racial
Evolution of the Right to Counsel, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1161 (2019).
241. NeJaime, supranote 166, at 700 (describing lawyers in the feminist movement as a "particularly
privileged demographic in the broader movement" who were less racially diverse, of higherincome, and more educated than other movement activists).
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decades ago that they are constrained by the elitist norms of the profession that
cast them as "heroes" to their "helpless" and "incapable" clients; today, lawyers
continue to erase or override client voices and, likely inadvertently, perpetuate
racialized stereotypes and structural inequality." I have previously described how
defenders are part ofthe "insider baseball" ofthe criminal legal process and are still
"partof the power structures that exclude nonlawyers and nonprofessionals from
the court systems and silence the people most affected." 4
This blurring of roles, coupled with attorney paternalism, can also result in
collaboration with the other side, which can play out to the detriment of those
Indeed, San Francisco DA Boudin
whose lives are actually impacted."
acknowledged that the defenders and prosecutors all know each other and have
professional relationships, such that the bigger change for him was not crossing
the aisle but rather going from being a line attorney to managing an office. 4
When the public defender's office is "cozy" with the prosecutor in our (at least
nominally) adversarial system, does that change the client's perception of
defenders' loyalty and zealous advocacy? Sociologist Matthew Clair exposed this
problematic dynamic in his in-depth study of the Boston criminal court system:
"Defense attorneys-caught between the expectations and power of prosecutors
and judges, on the one hand, and the hopes of their clients on the other-often
ignore, silence, and even coerce" their clients who attempt to exercise autonomy
and dignity.24
242. LOPEZ, supra note 25; see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Anthony V. Alfieri, (Re)Framing
Race in Civil Rights Lawyering, 130 YALE L.J. 2052, 2076 (2021) (describing how civil rights,
criminal defense, and other public interest lawyers often perpetuate racialized narratives "of
racial inferiority and chronic dependence" that both stigmatize and silence their clients).
243. Godsoe, supra note 25, at 717-25; see also RAPPING, supra note 240 (calling on defenders to
recognize their part in upholding the status quo and highlighting the need for a culture shift).
244. Jenny Roberts, Defense Lawyering in the Progressive Prosecution Era (manuscript on file with
author) (observing that for some defenders, "things changed overnight-from a highlycharged adversarial relationship with a harsh law-and-order prosecutor to, well, something
quite different" and remarking that this may make systemic advocacy by defenders, even
getting a seat at the table, harder since prosecutors now purportto speak for the accused).
245. Rachel Marshall & Chesa Boudin, Episode 4-The Personal Is Political: One on One
With DA Boudin and Rachel, CHASING JUST. (June 30, 2020), https://
www.chasingjusticepodcast.com/episodes/episode-4-the-personal-is-political
[https://perma.cc/X9ZZ-9B4A].
246.

MATTHEW CLAIR, PRIVILEGE AND PUNISHMENT: HOW RACE AND CLASS MATTER IN CRIMINAL

COURT 3 (2020). See also Matthew Caldwell, The End of PublicDefenders, INQUEST (Feb. 25
2022), https://inquest.org/the-end-of-public-defenders [https://perma.cc/39FY-BF8G (noting
the history of public defenders' institutional role as a "formative step in the expansion of our
system of mass arrest, guilty pleas, and incarceration," questioning whether public defenders
serve as a "check or a collaborator" to the carceral system, and concluding that most of the "job
came down to assisting the court, however unwillingly, in extracting guilty pleas from [his]
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This is a particular risk with progressive prosecutors. To cite just one
example, the Philadelphia head public defender described his close relationship
with Krasner's office: "We agree on so much at that top level... I don't see why
two people that have a major impact on the system would not get together to
figure out what we are doing, and where we want to be. That's how it should work,
right?"247 Yet at the "bottom," from most clients' perspectives, Krasner's office is
still prosecuting them or diverting them with the threat of punishment looming in
the background. In a system where the odds are so stacked in favor of one sidethe state-too much collaboration can miss an pivotal part of the defender roleto help articulate and publicize the systemic oppression of entire categories of
people.248 As a public defender myself, I quickly learned that my role in a system
stacked against my clients was sometimes to just be the only person in the
courtroom unequivocally on their side. For the same reason, that is, client trust in
their lawyer's loyalty, Bay Area public defender Avi Singh has cautioned against
appearing too friendly with his former colleague Boudin.249 More broadly, the
blurring of roles when the prosecutor claims the accused as their "people" may
perpetuate or even expand the system by using the criminal system to "help"
people who are trafficking victims or who have mental illness or substance abuse
issues.25 0
In addition to not allowing clients' voices to be heard, lawyers may curtail
movement goals by focusing on individual rights rather than considering larger
power issues. While scholars have suggested using a power lens to examine police
and other punitive state entities, lawyers rarely if ever apply this lens to themselves

247.

248.

249.

250.

clients and thereby burying misconduct on the part of the police, the prosecution, and the
court.")
Maura Ewing, Philadelphia'sNew Top ProsecutorlsRolling Out Wild, UnprecedentedCriminal
Justice Reforms, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/03/phillys-new-top-prosecutor-is-rolling-out-wild-unprecedentedcriminal-justice-reforms.html [https://perma.cc/DSU4-CF4F] (emphasis added).
See RAPPING, supra note 240 (calling on defenders to recognize their part in upholding the
status quo and highlighting the need for a culture shift); Daniel Farbman, Resistance
Lawyering, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1877 (2019) (providing examples of abolitionist lawyers in the
slavery era).
Rachel Marshall, Chesa Boudin, Avi Singh, & Sajid Khan, Episode 7- "Forthe People'
Finding the Humanity in Our Criminal Legal System, CHASING JUST. (July 21, 2020),
https://www.chasingjusticepodcast.com/episodes/episode-7-for-the-people
[https://perma.cc/L4U9-EEJZ].
Scholars have made the same arguments about the role conflation built into problem-solving
courts. See, e.g., Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEo. L.J. 1481 (2017); Aya Gruber, Amy J.
Cohen & Kate Mogulescu, Penal Welfare and the New Human TraffickingInterventionCourts,
68 FLA. L. REV. 1333 (2016).
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and their role in perpetuating the system because they focus on the individual and
use a narrow rights framework. 21 This can obscure systemic issues of racial
inequality and the criminalization of poverty and perpetuate narratives of
inferiority and pathology.22 To overcome these professional tendencies, Sameer
Ashar has encouraged lawyers to "think[] beneath and beyond liberal legalist
approaches to social problems... through collaborative work with people,
communities, and thinkers at the margins of our social structure.253 Most scholars
and lawyers, however, largely fail to grapple with these big questions and posit their
role as neutral or even heroic.254
Prosecutors must involve communities in actual decisionmaking as well as
let diversion programs be primarily led by those most system-impacted in order
to begin really representing the community. Below, I sketch out three models to
cede decisionmaking power and to learn from the true experts with lived
experience of the system: the participatory defense, mutual aid, and
transformative justice frameworks. Two clarifications are warranted. First, in
advocating for listening to community voices, I am referring to a categorical or
wholesale level, not an individual one. It is important for prosecutors to respond
where communities agree that prosecutions of, for instance, marijuana possession,
are racist and a waste of resources. They should not, however, heed calls to
prosecute individual 'X' for a certain crime. Second, community in terms ofvoting
districts is inextricably connected with race and class segregation. Accordingly, it

251.

Former public defender Alec Karakatsanis has described the "real failure of lawyers" on
both sides of the aisle as the failure to understand and engage with the people most
impacted, with bottom-up change, and with lawyers' concomitant reluctance to cede
financial, often racial, and cultural power. See Alice Speri, The CriminalJustice System Is
Not Broken. It's Doing What It Was Designed to Do., INTERCEPT (Nov. 9, 2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/11/09/criminal-justice-mass-incarceration-book
[https://perma.cc/Q2ZH-9SVX] (quoting Alec's description of lawyers failing "in our
understanding of politics, in our understanding of organizing, in our understanding of
power").
252. See Onwuachi-Willig & Alfieri, supra note 242.
253. Sameer M. Ashar, Deep Critique and Democratic Lawyering in Clinical Practice, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 201,210 (2016).
254. Many are also not conscious of the racialized roots of public defense and of ongoing racial
disparities in representation and advocacy. Yet, several scholars are surfacing this overlooked
history. See, e.g., Alexis Hoag, The Color ofJustice, 120 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (forthcoming 2021)
(noting that "many of the first public defender offices ignored the structural racism inherent in
the criminal adjudication process," and that for the next century white-dominated defender
offices did not advocate against mass criminalization, as Black-led defender organizations did);
Ossei-Owusu, supra note 240, at 1163 (arguing that "the politics of race fundamentally shaped
indigent defense jurisprudence and policy" in a manner that continues to leave defendants of
color disproportionately impacted by under-resourced defense providers).
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is essential that the community outreach and input be explicitly anti-hierarchical
and seek to empower marginalized voices.
1.

Centering Community Expertise

In centering community expertise and power, prosecutors can learn both
from movements that attempt to educate and transform defense attorneys and
from grassroots community movements. The first-learning from defense
movements-might seem odd, but given that "the people" prosecutors purport to
represent include defendants and their families, learning from these communities
is equally as important for prosecutors as for defenders. Indeed, even more so
since prosecutors' lack of a concrete client insulates them from direct external
input.25 As to the second, prosecutors have largely ignored the voices of the
communities from which most defendants-and most victims-originate. This
impedes prosecutors' ability to truly achieve justice and inhibits any large-scale
change. Securing community input and expanding notions of expertise beyond
the professional elite are essential to these goals.
Participatory defense and mutual aid models can help prosecutors move
towards this goal. The participatory defense movement takes as its centerpiece
dismantling the hierarchy between the system players and the people whose lives
are at stake. It seeks to increase the agency of those involved in the system, both for
better outcomes and for their dignity.256 As community organizer and cofounder
Raj Jayadev describes it, participatory defense is "not about the person receiving a
better service, it is about becoming the agent of change themselves."" To secure
better outcomes in individual cases, and even to further change the larger narrative
about who commits crimes and why, participatory defense also humanizes
defendants via videos about their lives and families. 258 A central tenet of the
movement is to have non-lawyer spaces-meetings and organizing spaces where
lawyers are not permitted. Otherwise, old habits would continue, with attorneys
taking the lead as the "experts" and clients and their families relying on the
attorneys rather than recognizing their collective "community intelligence" and

&

255. See Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, The Prosecutor'sClient Problem, 98 B.U. L. REv. 885 (2018).
256. Parent-led movements in the family policing space are adopting similar models to "humanize
the defendant ... and increase visible family presence" in individual cases, as well as to downsize and ultimately abolish the system as a whole. See, e.g., Family Reunification, Equity
Empowerment (Free) Project, STARTING OVER, INC., https://www.startingoverinc.org/free
[https://perma.cc/953D-RZAA].
257. Godsoe, ParticipatoryDefense, supra note 25, at 723 (quoting interview with Jayadev).
258. See Moore, Sandys, & Jayadev, supranote 99, at 1285.
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taking matters into their own hands.25 9 Despite the success of the participatory
defense approach both in individual cases and in changing the public
conversation, there remains pushback from defenders based on, I argue, a
reluctance to cede expertise and power."'
Mutual aid also provides a model for community empowerment and less
paternalistic lawyering. 261 Combining "no strings attached' material aid with
community organizing for societal change, mutual aid "practices non-hierarchy,
positioning recipients as members of the project-with a goal of selfdetermination.""2 Mutual aid is both a practical intervention and a political
movement; it is different from "charity" in the key sense that it is not a delivery
from the rich to the poor-based on the giver's funding priorities with many
strings attached and creating a shame in dependency. In contrast, mutual aid is
designed to be communally led through a relationship among equals. The aid is
not based on means-testing and carries no stigma or threats.2 3 Mutual aid also
builds solidarity. As Dean Spade describes, it is a "radical act of caring for each
other while working to change the world."26 4 Marginalized communities have long
practiced mutual aid for these reasons, including, for instance, the Black Panthers,
Young Lords Puerto Rican movement, and the transgender community.2 "'
Both models expand the notion of expertise more broadly. For instance, the
participatory defense movement has proffered community members as gang
experts to successfully counter police or other professional experts' testimony for
the prosecution. 266 Similarly, mutual aid posits communities themselves as most
knowledgeable about what they need on both a daily basis and broader level. If
involved at all, lawyers are mere recipients and members, like anyone else. Both
of these movements stand in stark contrast to the usual self-privileging role of
lawyers; the entire legal system, including legal education and particularly the bar
exam and attorney licensing structure, is based on the notion of lawyers as the

259. Godsoe, ParticipatoryDefense, supra note 25, at 722 (quoting interview with Jayadev).
260. Id.
261. Garcia & Godsoe, supra note 18, at nn. 53-68, 162-66. Id. at nn.71-84.
262. Id. at n.162 (quoting Tammy Gan, Mutual Aid: Non-Hierarchy in Practice, BAD ACTIVIST,
https://www.badactivistcollective.com/the-bad-book/mutual-aid-non-hierarchy
[https://perma.cc/M6X2-TLNF].
263. Id. at nn.53-54.
264. Mutual Aid: Building Solidarity During This Crisis (And the Next), DEAN SPADE, http://
www.deanspade.net/mutual-aid-building-solidarity-during-this-crisis-and-the-next
[https://perma.cc/EP4D-TSA5] (book abstract); DEAN SPADE, MUTUAL AID: BUILDING
SOLIDARITY DURING THIS CISIS (AND THE NEXT) 12, 82 (2020).

265. Garcia & Godsoe, supra note 18, at nn.71-84.
266. Id. at 722.
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ultimate experts. It acts as a gatekeeping mechanism separating "us" from
"them." This professional culture is both elitist and carceral.267 Knowledge and
the recognition of expertise represent power structures that are highly racialized,
gendered, and classist. 268 Consonant with these movements, Angela OnwuachiWillig and Anthony Alfieri argue for "civil self-defense," wherein lawyers witness
and embrace community of color-led advocacy campaigns that counter racist
tropes and humanize clients, rather than being the leaders and experts
themselves. 269
Prosecutors should incorporate the lessons of participatory defense and
mutual aid, give voice to previously silenced communities, and learn from their
expertise.27 Some are taking steps to do this with unprecedented levels of
community engagement. For instance, the "People's DA Platform" during the
2017 Philadelphia election of Larry Krasner brought together "communities on
the front lines of criminal justice reform." 71 Krasner continues to meet with awide
range of community members and coalitions which are much broader than most
prosecutors. 27 ' Though expanded input is positive, prosecutors are still largely

267.

See Alice Ristroph, The Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REv. 1631 (2020);
see also Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 591 (1982) (arguing that American legal education, although ostensibly nonideological, perpetuates hierarchy by justifying it as the result of a supposedly logical and
neutral process called "legal reasoning").
268. Like participatorydefense, participatory research centers the community members, "too often
viewed as [mere] research subjects," and prioritizes their needs and expertise to build change
"throughco-learning community-academic partnerships." Lauren Johnson, Cinnamon Pelly,
Ebony Ruhland, Simone Bess, Jacinda K. Dariotis, & Janet Moore, Reclaiming Safety:
Participatory Research, Community Perspectives, and Possibilities for Transformation, 18
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author) (offering the "first
known interdisciplinary, community-based participatory research study" focusing on what
safety is and how to make safety accessible to everyone).
269. Onwuachi-Willig & Alfieri, supra note 242, at 2075. Of course, community self-defense
requires that communities receive investments other than ones for the criminal system and
that programs be funded to the levels that institutions like law enforcement have been funded
historically. See supra note 245 (citing Patrick Sharkey's work). The backlash against and tepid
movement on shifting funding from policing to social services demonstrates how significant
this barrieris.
270. See Wright, supra note 171, at 416 (noting that "democracy deficits" have led to "intense
problems" for prosecutors with low-income and racially marginalized communities).
271.

PHIL. COAL. FOR A JUST DIST. ATT'Y, OUR VISION OF TRANSFORMATIVE POLICIES FOR THE FIRST

100 DAYS (2018), https://vorxbxy6lq-flywheel.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/04/PRINTDIGITAL-coc-da-platform_02-1.jpg
[https://perma.cc/EVG8-M9QD];
PHILLY DA FOR THE PEOPLE, https://www.phillydaforthepeople.org [https://perma.cc/34E5JWSH].
272. For instance, Krasner's office recently put together an LGBTQ advisory group. Brian X.
McCrone,
Philly DA Launches LGBTQ Advisory
Board as Transgender

The Place of the Prosecutor

221

gathering input rather than truly changing governance or ceding decisionmaking
influence. So, while Eric Gonzalez included community groups representing
formerly incarcerated people and public defenders in advising his reform
agenda, the focus was on "listening to the people of Brooklyn," not ceding
governance. 23 Moreover, it is arguably impossible for prosecutors to "co-govern"
with community organizations, given the structural power im balance. Instead,
community groups can use their status as constituents to "demand change" and
hold prosecutors accountable."'
Prosecutors also resist community involvement if it does not coordinate
precisely with their agendas. For instance, some prosecutors engaging in bail
reform have opposed community bail funds. They do so, presumably, because this
takes the control out of the prosecutor's hands. For instance, Rachael Rollins was
angry when someone the Boston community bail fund bailed out committed
another violent crime (avery rare occurrence, but obviously always a slight risk)."'
Calling them "coward[s]," Rollins used loaded and moralistic language to claim
her status as the true protector of, and voice for, the community. Giving
community leaders a place at the table is a start, but it is not enough. Communities

Residents
Face
Violence,
NBC:
PHILA.
(Mar.
29,
2021),
https://
www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/philly-da-launches-lgbtq-advisory-board-as[https://perma.cc/B8JMtransgender-residents-suffer-epidemic-of-violence/2759741
2DSZ]. Similarly, Boudin put together a transition team that included a broader array of
expertise than past DAs, but the team is "helping guide" him on policies only. San Francisco
DA-Elect Chesa Boudin Announces Transition Leadership Team, DAVIs VANGUARD (Nov. 23,
2019),
https://www.davisvanguard.org/2019/11/san-francisco-da-elect-chesa-boudinannounces-transition-leadership-team [https://perma.cc/B6AC-9FD7]; Chesa Boudin, San
Francisco DA-Elect, Announces Transition Leadership Team, S.F. RISING (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.sfrising.org/chesa-boudin-announces-transition-team [https://perma.cc/44ERGKBB].
273. GONZALEZ, supra note 178, at 9-11 (recommending that "the community be included in" the
prosecutor's work).
274. See CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. See also Wright, supra note 171, at 421-22
(describing how in order to overcome the historically disproportionate punishment and
alienation of certain communities, prosecutors should reach out to partner with groupsbeyond organized lobby groups-and nonprofits to include "inchoate groups [identified]
through social media" and even "informal coalitions that do not agree to 'partner'with the
prosecutor," but rather "push back" against them).
275. Liam Knox, Rollins Criticizes Group That Bailed Out Repeat Sex Offender Charged in New
Rape, WBUR NEws (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/08/11/da-rollinsmass-bail-fund-criticism [https://perma.cc/LED9-S7SS]. Krasner has also had disputes
with the Philadelphia community bail fund for not living up to his promises to change bail
practice. PHILA. BAIL FUND, RHETORIC vs. REALITY: THE UNACCEPTABLE USE OF CASH BAIL
BY THE PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

(July
2020),
https://www.phillybailfund.org/dao-policy-rhetoric-vs-reality
[https://perma.cc/PL73-GHR4].
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need to have decisionmaking power beyond the ballot box, incorporated in a
structural way, and not undermined by prosecutors when community efforts do
not precisely conform to the DA's direction.2 76
2.

Restorative & Transformative Justice

Transformative and restorative justice present another way to address harm
through transferring power from prosecutors to the community itself. This Part
outlines how progressive prosecutors are increasing their use of restorative justice
programs, though still not in the most serious cases or in widespread ways. As for
truly transformative justice processes, organizers argue, and I agree, that
prosecutors' role as an arm of state punishment means they cannot run these
programs. 27
Both restorative and transformative processes aim to address harm outside
of the traditional adversarial system, with a focus on addressing root causes and
resolving cases without a "winner" and "loser." In individual cases, restorative
justice "brings together those directly impacted by an act of harm to address the
impact of the crime, hold the person who did it accountable, and make things as
right as possible for those harmed." 28 This can take a number of different formsincluding victim/offender mediation, healing circles, and family group
conferencing-but the key is a move away from punishment to healing and
prevention. Transformative justice builds on the restorative approach to address
both individual and systemic change. Incorporating "analyses of privilege and
power," this framework posits that each incidence of personal harm can be
understood only in the "larger context of [gender, race, and class hierarchies and]
structural violence." 27 9 Remedies in an individual case, for instance, might include
community reparations as well as healing. Transformative justice can thus best be

276. I agree with commentators who argue that community voice and power should be as localized
as possible in order for people to have direct input on their governing institutions. See
O'Rourke, Su & Binder, supra note 123, at 1401 (recommending smaller localities for police
and sheriff departments as this allows for greater input and control for those communities,
particularly marginalized ones, most impacted by police).
277. See infra note 302.
278. Danielle Sered, Restorative Justice: Why Do We Need It?, COMMON JUST., https://
[https://perma.cc/
www.commonjustice.org/restorative justice-why-do-we needit
7YLG-PTNL].
279. Angela P. Harris, HeteropatriarchyKills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison Nation, 37
WASH. U. J.L. &POL'Y 13, 18-19, 52, 58 (2011).
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understood as a political framework, in addition to a case-by-case approach to
harm.280

A central principle of these alternative approaches to harm is that they are
victim-centered. 281 The victim must consent to the program and have a
meaningful opportunity to choose the conditions. Prosecutors often invoke
victims' names, but research has shown that prosecutors usually do not listen or
accord agency to victims who seek alternatives to the criminal system.282 In
contrast, restorative programs listen to victims and give them agency.2 3 Tellingly,
victim satisfaction from these programs is high, usually significantly exceeding
reported rates in the regular criminal system. 28 4
By definition, and certainly to succeed, these programs must be at least
partially independent from the prosecutor's office. 285 The threat of criminal
sanctions impairs true choice by both those who harm and those who are harmed;
this is especially true of the majority of programs that require a guilty plea for
participation.
Given the long trajectory of state violence against those
communities most likely to be involved in the criminal system (as both "offenders"
and "victims"), transformative justice in particular eschews reliance on state

280. Mia Mingus, Transformative Justice: A Brief Description, TRANSFORMHARM.ORG, https://
transformharm.org/transformative-justice-a-brief-description
[https://perma.cc/6DJNSVNC].
281. The particular failures of the criminal system toward victims in rape and family violence cases
give restorative models particular traction as to these complex crimes.
See, e.g.,
GENERATIONFIVE, ENDING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE HANDBOOK

(2017),
http://www.generationfive.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/TransformativeJustice-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/65TS-UJSY]; Wilson Wong, 'Defund the Police'
Movement Could Offer Sexual Assault Survivors a Different PathforJustice,Experts Say, NBC
NEws (Aug. 2, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/defund-police-movementcould-offer-sexual-assault-survivors-different-path-n235478
[https://perma.cc/MZ2ENBKH].
282. Susan A. Bandes, Victims, 'Closure,'andthe Sociology of Emotion, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,
14-15 (2009).
283. Donna Coker, Restorative Responses to Campus Sexual Harm: Promising Practices and
Challenges, 1 INT'L J. RESTORATIVE JUST. 385, 386 (2018) ("Restorative processes provide
victims with voice, validation and vindication.").
284. See e.g. DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON (2019) (over 90 percent versus under
50 percent for the criminal system); see also James Ptacek & Loretta Frederick,
Restorative Justice and Intimate Partner Violence, NAT'L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1, 6 (2008), https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/201609/ARRestorativeJusticeIPV.pdf [https://perma.cc/29ZC-GZ7D] (summarizing research on
multiple programs and reporting findings of higher victim satisfaction and feelings of dignity
and decreased sense of fear).
285. Indeed, as I argue below, truly effective programs should be divested from the criminal system
entirely and placed under independent community control.
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institutions, particularly policing and incarceration. 2 6 More broadly, restorative
and transformative processes are intended to be truly grassroots, run by
community members themselves-not attorneys or other "experts." Part of the
long-term aim is to build community capacity to deal with conflict via minimal
state involvement.2
Programs that are truly arms-length from prosecution provide significant
cost savings and have a considerable success rate for prevention of further crimes,
particularly violent and sexual crimes."' For instance, Common Justice, a
restorative justice program in Brooklyn which (unusually) addresses violent
crime, reports recidivism rates of its participants that are much lower than those of
people who have been incarcerated or assigned probation.2 9 Similarly, a program
for youth in Alameda County had only a five percent recidivism rate for those
charged with serious crimes and significantly lower rearrest and charging rates for
any crimes in comparison with those funneled through the regular criminal
system. The program also cost only $4500 per youth, versus $23,000 per year for
probation and $493,000-one hundred times more-for incarceration.2 9 To take
another data point, a Bay Area program working with incarcerated men who have
been charged with violent crimes has had 82 percent lower rearrest rates of
participants during the first year after release than the general incarcerated
population.2 91
A small but growing number of successful restorative justice programs exist,
reflecting in particular the ineffectiveness of traditional criminal systems at
addressing harm in communities of color. For instance, Black Youth Project 100
(BYP100) and the Crises Act aim to address the way that sexual assault of Black
girls and women is handled, both on an individual and systemic level. 2 92 They call

286. See Mingus, supra note 280 ("State responses to violence reproduce violence and often
traumatize those who are exposed to such responses, especially oppressed communities who
are already targeted by the state.").
287. Id.
288. Godsoe, The Myth of the Juvenile Sex Offender, supra note 18, at 349, 357-58.
289. SERED, supra note 284.
290. Taylor Walker, A Blueprint for Reimagining Alameda County's Youth Justice System to
Prioritize Healing Over Incarceration, WITNESS L.A. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://
witnessla.com/a-blueprint-for-reimagining-alameda-countys-youth-justice-system-toprioritize-healing-over-incarceration [https://perma.cc/9VEZ-VKQL].
291. James Gilligan &Bandy Lee, The Resolve to Stop the Violence Project: Reducing Violence in the
Community Through a Jail-BasedInitiative, 27 J. PuB. HEALTH 143, 147 (2005) (reporting
findings of lower rearrest rates for violent crimes by participants in the program as well as less
time spent in custody).
292. See BYP100, Take the #SheSafeWeSafe Pledge!, ACTION NETWORK, https://
actionnetwork.org/petitions/shesafewesafe
[https://perma.cc/UY8E-J4ZH] ("pledging to

The Place of the Prosecutor

225

for changing the first responders from police to community-based organizations
(CBOs), so people never even enter the front door of the criminal system. 293
Another example is the Violence Interrupters, a particularly effective preventive
restorative justice model to address gun crime. 294 This organization's approach to
violence uses community members, often with criminal system experience
themselves, to serve as on-the-ground mediators of disputes that otherwise might
flare into violence.
Despite their success, these programs remain underutilized and
underfunded, largely due to prosecutors' reluctance to cede control coupled with
their frequent disregard for victims who are anticarceral. When prosecutors do
engage, they do so in very minimal ways. 295 Most prosecutors, for instance, refuse
to allow this intervention for anything but minor or nonviolent offensesCommon Justice is an outlier. Yet this on minor crimes can increase the netwidening impact of diversion programs. The end result is that most restorative
justice programs run byprosecutors' offices differ little from standard prosecution
and only divert a small number ofvery minor cases. 29
In contrast to mainstream prosecutors, many self-identified progressives
have expanded their use of restorative justice. For instance, Eric Gonzalez is
expanding Common Justice and using Violence Interrupters.297 Kim Gardner
has pledged to incorporate restorative justice, including into plea offers "on more
serious cases."298 Former Manhattan DA candidate Janos Marton proposed

293.

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

listen to survivors" and seek "community-based alternatives to addressing harm instead of
calling the police... [because] police interaction puts Black people at risk of increased poverty,
surveillance, incarceration, beatings, rape, and even death.").
These programs have had success in multiple sites, including, most recently, Denver. See Joe
Jurado, Early Report Finds Denver Program That Sends Healthcare Workers to Handle Mental
Health Calls Instead of Police Has Been a Success, RooT (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://www.theroot.com/early-report-finds-denver-program-that-sends-healthcare1846233628 [https://perma.cc/H7VU-8S5L].
See Who Are the Violence Interrupters?, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Oct. 28, 2009), https://
nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/who-are-violence-interrupters [https://perma.cc/2JUA-KSE3].
Bazelon & Green, supra note 191, at 2296-98.
Id. at 2304-06.
See Eric Gonzalez, Using the Power ofProsecutorsto DriveReform, 34 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. MAG.
9, 12, 14 (2019).
Kim Will Continue to Attack and Prevent Violent Crime, RE-ELECT KIMBERLY GARDNER (May
21, 2020), https://votekimgardner.com/2020/05/21/kim-will-continue-to-attack-and-preventviolent-crime [https://perma.cc/9JSA-BRNT].
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working with CBOs in IPV cases to offer restorative justice and other alternative
interventions, prosecuting only with victim approval and as a last resort. 299
Many of these programs, however, continue to be limited by exceptionalism
and the concomitant net-widening. For instance, most programs exclude those
charged with more serious crimes, or even most crimes, and are often limited to
juveniles involved in the system or others deemed less culpable. For instance,
Boudin's partnership with a CBO to conduct restorative justice in San Francisco is
limited to young adults (ages eighteen to twenty-five)." And, despite it being
portrayed as a community approach, its funding from the state Board of
Corrections and partnership with DA's offices makes it unclear how separate from
the carceral state restorative justice can really be. Ceding control to communities
and divesting funding are inextricably connected; arms-length or truly
independent restorative justice programs would be allocated funding directly
from noncriminal government agencies. Relatedly, can the Violence Interrupters
really work effectively at prevention when coupled with very harsh prosecutorial
approach with no opportunity for bail?301 It is a very delicate, or perhaps
impossible, matter to achieve the community trust and buy-in necessary for
preventive programs while also being really 'tough on crime.'
Raising even more questions about their appropriate role, a handful of
progressive prosecutors are attempting the even more unusual task of engaging in
systemic transformative justice programs. 3 2 Three of these prosecutors-

&

299. See Janos Marton, Reimagining OurResponse to IntimatePartner Violence, MEDIUM (July 7,
2020),
https://janosforda.medium.com/reimagining-our-response-to-intimate-partnerviolence-5d1059fc6b7b [https://perma.cc/DR8G-EHSU].
300. COMMUNITY WORKs, http://communityworkswest.org [https://perma.cc/R3HM-XPEQ].
301. See, e.g., Main, supra note 158 (interviewing Foxx, who posits a multi-pronged, "all-handson-deck" approach to address gun violence in Chicago, including police, no-bail prosecutions,
and preventive restorative justice efforts, such as the Violence Interrupters).
302. Similar initiatives to combat police violence led to reparations in Chicago-the first
issued by a city in the nation-and are now being attempted in the Bronx. Logan Jaffe, The
Nation's First Reparations Package to Survivors of Police Torture Included a Public
Memorial. Survivors Are
Still
Waiting., PROPUBLICA
(July
3,
2020),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nations-first-reparations-package-to-survivorsof-police-torture-included-a-public-memorial-survivors-are- still-waiting/amp.
Importantly, these initiatives are led by CBOs, not prosecutors' offices. See Mary Childs
Noel King, Reparations for Police Brutality, NPR (July 3, 2020), https://www.npr.org/
2020/07/02/886945461/reparations-for-police-brutality
[https://perma.cc/3LDP-V367]
(discussing unprecedented
reparations
for police
brutality in Chicago);
Natalie Y. Moore, Payback, Marshall Project (Oct. 30, 2018), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2018/10/30/payback
[https://perma.cc/4XDZ-YREK]
(describing how a "group of activists and artists," along with social justice lawyers, formed
Chicago Torture Justice Memorials to ask for unprecedented individual and community
reparations); Demand Letter from Bronx Defs. on Behalf of the Mott Haven Collective to
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Boudin, Krasner, and Rollins-have teamed up with community organizations
to try to implement a systemic reparations approach via a local "Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission."" 3 Modeled after the South African post-apartheid
panels, these commissions will provide a forum for people harmed by racialized
police violence and the carceral state to be heard and have harms redressed. This
is certainly a positive step in naming the harm and overcoming the historically
overly cozy relationships between police and prosecutors. While the project exists
to nominally hold both police and prosecutors accountable, specifics of how
expression and redress will happen remain unclear.
These widespread systemic efforts have brought forth considerable criticism
about the appropriate role of prosecutors and the limits of the criminal legal
system. Community organizers have stated that they are "appalled and angered"
that prosecutors, or "top cops," are attempting to lead community reparations
about police violence when they themselves engage in state surveillance and
punishment of communities of color. 304 They also note that a truth and

Bill de Blasio, Mayor of New York City, and Scott M. Singer, Comptroller of
New York City (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.bronxdefenders.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/01/2021.26.01-Mott-Haven-Collective-Demand.pdf
(asking the New
York City Mayor and Comptroller to approve a reparations fund to compensate people
for injuries and other harms from New York Police Department (NYPD) abuse, as well
as to fund public services as determined by the Mott Haven community, rather than
suing the NYPD).
303. Greenwald, supra note 218. Later reports state that the San Francisco program will not be
run out of Boudin's office, but rather from a local nonprofit at armslength from the DA,
while the Boston and Philadelphia Commissions appear to canceled. John Ferrannini, SF
DA's Truth Commission Pushed Back, Yet Again, BAY AREA REP.
(Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.ebar.com/news/latest-news//310351 [https://perma.cc/WJL2-LBMS ] (detailing
a lack of response from the Philadelphia DA's office and a statement from the Boston DA that
the office "continue[s] to explore how the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission may
be able to help the community... [but t]he global pandemic has required us to adapt and
reallocate our attention to deal with the disparities in health care, education, housing, and
public health and public safety.").
304. Elias Rodriques, Melonie Griffiths, & Ralowe Ampu, Opinion, ProsecutorsHave No Place
in Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commissions, TRUTHOUT (Aug. 22, 2020),
https://truthout.org/articles/prosecutors-have-no-place-in-truth-justice-andreconciliation-commissions [https://perma.cc/EEF4-DV37]; see also Sia Henry, Opinion:
Restorative Justice Is Used to Legitimize Oppressive Systems, JUv. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (Feb. 22
2022),
https://jjie.org/2021/02/22/restorative-justice-is-used-to-legitimize-oppressivesystems [https://perma.cc/FT72-66DM] (noting the "danger in restorative justice being used
as a way to stabilize, if not legitimize, traditionally racist and toxic systems"). Interestingly,
Boston City Council members are backing a new proposal for the formation of a commission
on reparations for African Americans in the city, unconnected to the DA's office. See Three
Boston City Councilors Propose Commission on Reparationsfor African Americans, WCVB
(Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.wcvb.com/article/three-boston-city-councilors-proposecommission-on-reparations-for-african-
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reconciliation model is "fundamentally opposed to prosecution.""' Is it possible
to achieve widescale justice via an office that also prosecutes and punishes
individuals? Probably not.
Boudin, Foxx, and others also seek to give defendants and victims in the
system more dignity. The question remains-can anyone really be treated as a
dignified human in our criminal system? Put another way, is prosecution itself,
which results in caging and otherwise harming people, not an act of state violence
that is by definition dehumanizing? Given this, I agree with community
organizers that prosecutors are not the right people to run transformative justice
programs, nor can they fully empower and dignify people.

americans/38963072#:-:text=Three%20members%20of%20the%20Boston,day%200f%
20Black%2OHistory%2OMonth.
305. This is a critique many made of the South African model, which eventually did prosecute more
than pay reparations or achieve meaningful reconciliation. Nahla Valji persuasively argues
that through its narrow investigation and prosecution of "gross violations of human rights,"
the Commission focused primarily on individualized responsibility, thus failing to address the
"everyday administrative horrors" that created a system of racial imbalance in South Africa; as
a result, the process left many South Africans feeling unrepresented by "those the
Commission define [d] as perpetrators." NAHLA VALJI, RACE AND RECONCILIATION IN A
POST-TRC SOUTH AFRICA 1-2 (2004); see also Jay A. Vora & Erika Vora, The Effectiveness
of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner,
and English South Africans, 34 J. BLACK STUD. 301, 317-18 (2004) (reporting the results of
their empirical study to evaluate the effectiveness of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission through the lens of several ethnic groups (Xhosa, Afrikaners, and English)
and concluding that, because the Truth and Reconciliation Commission focused more on
social and judicial goals to reconciliation, there was less emphasis on psychological and
personal factors, which may have facilitated true reconciliation). As a result, most experts
believe it did not successfully address the root causes of racist state violence or move the
country much closer to racial equality. See, e.g., Mary Kay Magistad,South Africa's Imperfect
Progress,20 Years After the Truth & Reconciliation Commission, WORLD (Apr. 6,2017, 1:45
AM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-04-06/south-africas-imperfect-progress-20-yearsafter-truth-reconciliation-commission [https://perma.cc/5R9L-E23J] ("When apartheid ended
and the Truth and Reconciliation process started, ['colored' South African Brendon] Adams
says he thought it would genuinely lead to a united South Africa. He's disappointed that the
colored population [in South Africa] has been left behind, effectively ghettoized .... "); Kim
Harrisberg, South Africans Protest Police Brutality Against Poor, Black Communities Under
Lockdown, GLOB. CITIZEN (June 11, 2020), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/southafrica-police-brutality-poor-black-protest
[https://perma.cc/65V2-M782] (noting that,
according to the World Bank, "South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the
world.. .with urban areas starkly divided along racial lines."); Ereshnee Naidu-Silverman,
What South Africa Can Teach the U.S. About Reparations,WASH. POST (June 25, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/25/what-south-africa-can-teach-us-aboutreparations [https://perma.cc/N7WQ-NTMY] ("There was a general feeling among the black
South African public that despite being victims, they were once again required to accept the
mantle of reconciliation, while white South Africans remained comfortable in their positions
of historic privilege.").
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Divest and Invest to Reimagine Public Safety

To truly transform the criminal legal system, prosecutors need to cede
material resources in addition to relinquishing epistemic and cultural power.
Public funding currently spent on prosecution should instead be invested in
societal supports, such as housing, childcare, and mental health and substance
abuse treatment care, that address the root causes of crime, including violent
crime. Only this fiscal investment can rectify decades of failure to support
people and communities, with state funding in predominantly Black and
Brown communities being almost exclusively limited to policing and the
criminal system. 306 It is a zero-sum equation. As Monica Bell has demonstrated,
"[m] any of the states with the least generous social safety nets use criminal justice
to stand in for poverty alleviation and thus have had the nation's highest
incarceration rates." 0 7 Reallocating funds is a longer-term but essential aim in
transforming the criminal system; to get to a future with no prosecutors,
"movements need to build significant power [through organizing] ... while
remaining pointedly focused on shrinking the power, size, and scope of the
prosecuting office."308
Even progressive prosecutors support reforms only up to a certain point; this
has been particularly true of the consistently demanded open-file discovery and
bail reform. Many of this cohort supported some measures in this regard, even
legislative change, but curtailed or reversed their support once it seemed that they
would lose too much control or when unusual events, such as the pandemic, led to
more strident media calls for doubling down on the traditional law-and-order
model. 309 A particular pitfall impeding divestment from the racialized criminal

306. See, e.g., ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTs., supra note 230, at 1-3 (detailing the historic
"disinvestment" in communities of color and noting that "too often, law enforcement officers
are the primary-or only-responders to public health problems," including mental health,
substance abuse, housing, student discipline, etc.); see also SHARKEY, supra note 157, at 115-45
(documenting that the primary investment in lower-income communities since the Jim Crow
era has been policing and the criminal system, and calling for new investments as the country
moves "away from the idea that punishment can be a sustainable solution to the problem of
urban poverty.").
307. Monica C. Bell, Response, Hidden Laws of the Time ofFerguson, 132 HARv. L. REv. F. 1, 12-13
(2018).
308. CMTY. JUSTICE EXCH. ET AL., supranote 1, at 4.
309. See Barkow, supra note 225, at 1390-92 (detailing how Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez supported
discovery reform until he perceived the reforms as going too far but also noting that, Chesa
Boudin has consistently refused to have his line prosecutors demand cash bail).
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system and mass incarceration are the requests for more funding to implement
reforms by these progressive prosecutors."'
Divesting and investing do not just entail better allocation of societal
resources.
Divesting and investing also prompt questioning of existing
perceptions of public safety, change the sticky narrative that "caging and
controlling people makes us safe," and offer the alternative that "basic necessities
such as food, shelter, and freedom are what really make our communities
secure."" On a broader scale, greater societal equality and more funding for
families and children are proven to reduce harm and to help victims heal."
Recognizing this can help society shift from a fear-based to a care-based
framework for true community safety. 13
1.

Decrease Prosecutorial Budgets

An obvious step to shrinking the criminal system footprint is reducing the
budget of system actors. Despite their otherwise far-reaching platforms for
change, none of the progressive prosecutors specifically cite downsizing their
offices or cutting their budgets. A few mention shrinking the footprint of the
criminal legal system but, even then, make no specific proposals for how to do that.
Tellingly, the widespread and (deservedly) praised transparency of this new group
of prosecutors does not extend to budget information. This is true even from those

310.
311.
312.

See discussion infra at IV.B.1.
CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://www.criticalresistance.org [https://perma.cc/9G9V-YE7G].
Godsoe, The Victim/Offender Overlap & CriminalSystem Reform, supra note 68 at notes 10306 (noting that "economic stress and underresourced communities are overwhelmingly
correlated with violence.").

313.

See ZACH NORRIS, DEFUND FEAR: SAFETY WITHOUT POLICING, PRISONS, AND PUNISHMENT

(2020) (proposing a continuum of societal supports in place of criminalization and
punishment and citing successful community programs).
I recognize that this
rearrangement of the economy and civil society is not imminent, but it is still a goal worth
striving for. And, as with the acknowledgement of racist state violence, the pandemic has
brought unprecedented (if perhaps temporary) recognition of inequality and concomitant
public support for state support for families. See Cynthia Godsoe & Steven Dean, It's Time
for an Antiracist Welfare Policy,
IMPRINT (Mar. 15, 2021, 7:47 AM),
https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/time-for-an-antiracist-welfare-policyamerica/52691 [https://perma.cc/42MY-HCYW] (reporting the unprecedented nature
of a direct child allowance, as implemented in the summer of 2021, while also calling for further
supports for families, particularly families of color who historically have been marginalized and
even punished for their poverty).

The Place of the Prosecutor

231

"

such as Kim Foxx and Larry Krasner who have made public unprecedented data
and information about their offices. 31
Although information on budgets and staff sizes is hard to come by, one thing
is clear-none of these progressive prosecutors have meaningfully decreased, or
even chosen to decrease at all, their budgets and staff sizes of their own accord.
Indeed, almost all have asked for and sometimes received increased resources to
hire new attorneys and other staff. Sometimes the request is for line attorneys and
investigators, and other times for diversion programs and other innovations. For
instance, soon oon after taking office, Foxx requested more than twenty new
attorneys to implement her agenda; even more recently, Krasner has asked for
several significant budget increases to add staff members, mostly to fight gun
violence and prosecute police abuse, and to increase equality among his staff-the
latter request "hijack[ing] a hearing on economic development.3 15 These requests
are motivated by all three of the pitfalls identified above: exceptionalism in
increasing resources to prosecute certain crimes, such as sexual assault or police
violence, net-widening via more funding for diversion programs, and the hero
complex that only prosecutors and more prosecutors can solve societal problems.
The only budgetary decreases have not come voluntarily but rather were
forced on prosecutors by the pandemic's fiscal impact on all government
agencies. Notably, one of the prosecutors with the most far-reaching change
platform, Boudin, did not submit a reduced budget request this spring despite
the San Francisco mayor's request that all agencies do so. Boudin cited his

314. These prosecutors have failed to release budget information despite promising to do so. See
Becton, Deberry, Gardner, Foxx & Rollins, supra note 7. Moreover, prosecutorial access to
other funding, such as civil forfeiture funds, both expands their financial resources and
obscures the true extent of them. See e.g., SURVIVED AND PUNISHED, supra note 177, at 5-6
(making this point as to the Manhattan DA's office, which as of June 2017 had accrued $730
million in asset forfeiture funds).
315. See Lolly Bowean, Cook County Board Approves $6.2 Billion Budget for 2020, Without
Increases in Taxes or Fees, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 21, 2019, 6:50 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-cook-county-board-approves-2020-201911217ndxlv4utzahpomkpdfsouuyne-story.html
[https://perma.cc/G3FV-SJQJ];
Michael
D'Onofrio, PhillyCity CouncilApproves $4.8B BudgetFull of Cuts, Layoffs, PA. CAP.-STAR (June
25, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://www.penncapital-star.com/government-politics/philly-citycouncil-approves-4-8b-budget-full-of-cuts-layoffs
[https://perma.cc/B82R-8TWW].
The
latter request was made by a Krasner representative at a hearing on economic development in
Philadelphia, and was deemed by numerous attendees to be "disrespectful and unempathetic"
to the small business owners and other intended participants. See Todd Shepherd, Krasner's
Office Asks for Raises at Hearing on Impact of Crime on Philly's NeighborhoodEconomies,
BROAD AND LIBERTY (Oct. 6, 2021), https://broadandliberty.com/2021/10/06/krasners-officeasks-for-raises [https://perma.cc/BYW6-2S6R] (quoting Jabari Jones, an organizer of the
event and president of a local community group).
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opposition to laying off any staff as the reason; this loyalty to his employees,
however commendable, is preserving the status quo of the criminal arm of the
prosecutor's office. As such, it stands in stark contrast to movement actors'
demands of "reduced budgets, staff, and scope of power."316
Beyond their own budgets, prosecutors could use their considerable
lobbying power to advocate for allocating greater state resources to noncriminal
agencies, such as away from the police and toward education and health care.17 To
take just one example, they could support directing more federal VAWA funding
toward what IPV survivors most need-housing, childcare, and trauma-informed
mental health and medical services-instead of the ongoing increase to policing
and other law enforcement services. 318 There is no indication that they are doing
this consistently, if at all.
A few positive trends are emerging, however. Several of this cohort,
including Krasner and Rollins, are pledging to give a portion of their city's civil
asset forfeiture fund-usually a boon to prosecutors to fund their operations-to
recreation centers and community programs in low-income communities. 319
Even more significantly, advocacy groups called on the candidates in the recent
high-profile Manhattan DA race (most of whom identified as progressive) to
commit to cutting their offices by 50 percent.320 Only two candidates pledged to
do so, but this pressure also impacted many of the other candidates, including the
winner, Alvin Bragg.321 Campaign promises are obviously different than
316. Survived & Punished NY (@survivepunishNY), TWITTER (June 30, 2020, 9:53 AM),
https://twitter.com/survivepunishNY/status/1278007963031146497
[https://
perma.cc/K3EV-M6FV].
317. A growing number of community movements are calling for funds to be reallocated from
policing and incarceration to "long-term safety strategies such as education, local restorative
justice services, and employment programs." See, e.g., MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, supranote
227.
318. See Jessica Pishko, The Defund Movement Aims to Change the Policing and Prosecution of
Domestic Violence, APPEAL (July 28, 2020), https://theappeal.org/the-defund-movementaims-to-change-the-policing-and-prosecution-of-domestic-violence
[https://perma.cc/SCE7-QZYG].
319. See, e.g., D'Onofrio, supra note 315; RACHAEL ROLLINS, ASSET FORFEITURE COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT

GRANT:

REQUEST

FOR

PROPOSAL

(RFP)

2-3

(2019),

https://

staticl.squarespace.com/static/5c671e8e2727be4ad82ffle9/t/5cf00af22759a10001fbc7a3/155
9235314586/FY19+SCDAO+Communitiy+Reinvestment+Grant+RFP+FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7L4Z-9FCF].
320. See Meet the Candidates: Candidate Questionnaire, PEOPLE'S COAL. FOR MANHATTAN DA
ACCOUNTABILITY,
https://peopleforprosecutoraccountability.org/candidate-comparison
[https://perma.cc/LJZ6-AUMV].
321. Bragg has explicitly pledged to "shrink the system," including via categorical declinations of
certain crimes and has also decried the false dichotomy between system reform and public
safety. See Samar Khurshid, Debate Over Reform and Safety in ManhattanDistrictAttorney
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implementing policies when in office, but this still signals a changing dialogue.
Despite these changes, however, most progressive prosecutors are not giving up
their resources and, indeed, are calling for increased societal investment in
prosecution as a solution to societal problems.
2.

Increase Social Infrastructure

Transformation also requires investment in effective and truly independent
services, ones that address the root causes of crime, engage in prevention, and are
run not by prosecutors but by community actors. Research indicates that societal
supports such as childcare and home repairs, 322 as well as community-based
interventions that focus on economic and social supports rather than just law
enforcement, are more effective at preventing even violent crimes than the current

21,
2021),
https://
GOTHAM
GAZETTE
(Sept.
General
Election,
www.gothamgazette.com/state/ 10776-debate-over-reform-and-safety-in-manhattandistrict-attorney-general-election [https://perma.cc/YA4L-HEYT]. How this interacts with
budget requests, of course, remains to be seen.
322. See, e.g., NAT'L RSCH. COUNCIL NAT'L ACADS., supra note 67, at 127 (citing urban economic
distress as a significant driver of crime necessitating social infrastructure remedies); see also
SHARKEY, supra note 157 (gathering and explaining research); MICHAEL A. RAMOS, 25 YEARS
IN, WE'RE MORE SURE THAN EVER THAT CRIME PREVENTION STARTS IN EARLY CHILDHOOD

(2021), https://strongnation.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/1409/e14635c9-e5a0-4369a803-aacc17961db9.pdf? 1634320897&inline;%20filename=%2225%20Years%20In,
%20We%E2%80%99re%2OMore%2OSure%2OThan%2OEver%20that%2OCrime%20Prevent
ion%20Starts%20in%2OEarly%2OChildhood.pdf%22
[https://perma.cc/9SK9-52D9]
(summarizing research demonstrating that early childhood education, after-school programs,
and other supports for children and families are proven to decrease crime); Eugenia South,
John MacDonald & Vincent Reina, Association Between StructuralHousingRepairsfor LowIncome Homeowners and Neighborhood Crime, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (July 21, 2021),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2782142
[https://perma.cc/GJP9-HCCL] (finding a "dose-dependent" relationship between housing
repairs in low-income, largely Black communities and reduction (21.9 percent) in crime,
including reductions in violent crime such as assault, robbery, and homicide).
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system is. 323 Some progressive prosecutors openly acknowledge this. 324 This
investment is particularly crucial in the United States, given the country's
criminalization of poverty and lack of social supports. Ideally, such programs are
universal, to avoid the stigma long coupled with income-based societal supports,
in contrast to the COVID relief checks, for instance, which applied to more
middle-class families and were less stigmatized. 325 This requires real change to
funding streams and the institutional structure addressing societal problems such
as homelessness and substance abuse: a public health and harm reduction model
rather than a criminal framework. 326 We are a long way from achieving this kind
of change in mindset and funding a more robust social safety net in place of the
criminal system. Nonetheless, the last year alone has seen change in this regard,
even if only temporarily, change that can safely be termed radical by historical
standards in the United States-both the child allowance and greater investment
in child care and preschool. 327

323. Despite their underfunding, research consistently shows that community-based and more
localized and holistic interventions such as violence interrupters or Ceasefire Projects in
Boston and Oakland perform better than, or at least as well as, our current law enforcement
and prosecution framework with far fewer accompanying costs and harms. See, e.g., David
Alan Sklansky, Addressing Violent CrimeMore Effectively, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (citing the
Boston program's reduction of youth gun violence by 50 percent); NORRIs, supra note 313, at
83-88 (describing a community-based intervention in Richmond, Virginia, using formerly
incarcerated "neighborhood change agents," cash stipends, and social services, which is
credited in large part with a 77 percent murder rate decline in its first 7 years); Karma, supra
note 231 (quoting Patrick Sharkey on "extraordinarily effective" programs in Chicago,
including mentoring and cognitive behavioral therapy, and, in another program, summer jobs
placement which resulted in 40 to 50 percent decreases in violence and concluding that even
including those programs that do have mixed results, often based upon local implementation,
"the evidence base for a community response to violence is at least as strong as the evidence
base for policing.").
324. See, e.g., Main, supra note 158 (quoting Kim Foxx on economic development in low-income
neighborhoods as a long-term solution to violence).
325. GORDON, supra note 107.
326. Sharkey, one of the foremost experts on addressing entrenched inequality and
intergenerational urban poverty, argues that it is not sufficient to downsize the criminal system
and expect the same impoverished neighborhoods decimated by mass incarceration to absorb
re-entry of those formerly incarcerated in prisons. Rather, new investments in employment,
housing, and physical and mental health care must be made so that "[a] fter years of relying on
the police and the prison to deal with the problem of urban poverty through brute force,. .. we
ensure that a new set of guardians is prepared to lookout over every neighborhood." SHARKEY,
supra note 157, at 144-45.
327. See Godsoe & Dean, supra note 314 (reporting the unprecedented nature of a direct child
allowance, as implemented in the summer of 2021). At the same time, it was not renewed for
a second year, in the one-step forward, two-steps back, or two-steps forward, one-step back
path to change that is so central to the American approach to societal problems. Deepa
Shivaram, Families Are in DistressAfter the First Month Without the Expanded Child Tax
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I should clarify that investing in societal supports via the prosecutor's office
or another criminal agency is not sufficient-surveillance and threat of
punishment loom in the background. For instance, advocates note that only 4.5
percent of the Alameda County probation budget for youth is distributed to
programs run by CBOs. 328 Increasing that percentage would be beneficial, but
optimally the county would decrease probation's, and the prosecutors', budgets
and reallocate funds to noncriminal government agencies, such as education.
Community activists presciently point out that "prosecutors are not social
workers [and] ... [r]esource shifting... to carceral social services is not deresourcing." 329 Shifting funding to quasi-criminal social and medical services will
not work either, as demonstrated all too well by the child "welfare"/family
regulation system."' True investment in public safety requires supports provided
in a humane manner, without surveillance and punishment.
Though few, there are a growing number of community campaigns
redirecting funding from police and jails to other kinds of public resources. Local
campaigns, such as Atlanta's Communities Over Cages, have had success with this
argument for defunding incarceration-now the argument needs to be extended
to the criminal system more broadly." To take another example, Alameda
community groups call for divesting from probation and police funding and

Credit,NPR (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/01/21/ 1074413273/end-expandedchild-tax-credit-families-effects [https://perma.cc/ 8UMZ-FFNF].
328.

AMISHA KAMBATH, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., REIMAGINING YOUTH JUSTICE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR ALAMEDA COUNTY (Oct. 2020), https://ellabakercenter.org/wp-

content/uploads/2020/10/Reimagining-Youth-Justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LTDE6RV]; A Blueprint for Reimagining Almeda County's Youth Justice System To
Prioritize Healing Over Incarceration, ROSENBERG FOUND.
(Oct. 26, 2020),
https://rosenbergfound.org/a-blueprint-for-reimagining-alameda-countysyouthjustice-system-to-prioritize-healing-over-incarceration [https://perma.cc/EV7XSSXB].
329. CMTY. JUST. EXCH. ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
330. See Godsoe, An Abolitionist Horizon for Child Welfare, supra note 18 (explaining how the
system runs parallel to the criminal system and harms rather than helps families because it
is essentially "a coercive state apparatus that controls and punishes poor and Black and
Brown families."); see also RISE & TAKEROOT JUSTICE, AN UNAVOIDABLE SYSTEM: THE HARMS
OF FAMILY POLICING AND PARENTS' VISION FOR INVESTING IN COMMUNITY CARE (2021),

&

331.

https://www.risemagazine.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/
AnUnavoidableSystem.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7G4-P5H2] (reporting interviews of systeminvolved parents in New York City).
Atlanta's campaign emphasizes that true equity means "redistributing resources where they
are most needed and shifting power to the hands of communities." CLOSE THE JAIL ATL
DESIGNING JUSTICE + DESIGNING SPACES, RAZE & REPLACE: THE PEOPLE'S PLAN TO REIMAGINE

ATLANTA,
https://www.closethejailatl.org/_files/ugd/c1b234_9356fd044f5d423ba25a
61025ac48118.pdf [https://perma.cc/77V2-DD9U].
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investing in community supports for youth and family; they also organized a
"truth and reinvestment" campaign to divest from the criminal system and invest
in low-income communities and communities of color."' Again, the volume of
material on police and silence as to prosecutors in such campaigns is striking, but
the same principles of reducing the police role in addressing social problems,
investing in communities for safety and equality, and developing independent
oversight systems can apply very well to prosecutors." For instance, the "safely
home campaign" focuses on diverting funds from juvenile detention and building
community capacity with recreation centers and parks, functional and resourced
schools, and after-school programs and summer jobs." 4 Voters in Los Angeles
County have gone even further to enact budget reform by referendum. In the
same election when Gascon was elected as DA, they passed Measure J, mandating
that 10 percent of the county's unrestricted budget fund youth and community
development, health care, and diversion programs." All of these campaigns
could also expand to include downsizing prosecution, as well as police and
prisons.
Of course, prosecutors alone cannot accomplish this funding
reallocation, but they can advocate for decreasing their own funding and
footprint, and for increasing funding for noncriminal system programs.
I recognize that many prosecutors' offices are underfunded for what they
are currentlybeing tasked with and that scant resources can lead to shortcuts and
bad processes.336 The solution is not, however, to fund them more. As with the
police, providing more funding to "fix" prosecutors' offices continues to expand
the system without addressing the main problem-that the office is already too
big and cannot effectively do most of what it is tasked with. Accordingly, the only
meaningful solution is for prosecutors to shrink their offices while using their
considerable political power to advocate for increased funding for societal

332. Zachary Norris, Truth and Reinvestment: Why We Need Reparationsfor Right Now, ELLA
BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTs. (Mar. 9, 2016), https://ellabakercenter.medium.com/truth-andreinvestment-why-we-need-reparations-for-right-now-2dba1f26cb49
[https://
perma.cc/LQV2-LNN8]; see also John Sapida, Ella Baker Center Continues the Fightfor
'Books Not Bars', WITNESS, https://blog.witness.org/2015/04/ella-baker-center-continuesthe-fight-for-books-not-bars [https://perma.cc/YQY5-Z6TJ].
333. A Roadmapfor Re-ImaginingPublicSafety in the UnitedStates, HUM. RTs. WATCH (Aug. 12,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/12/roadmap-re-imagining-publicsafety-united-states [https://perma.cc/2M2G-SN86].
334. Shaena Fazal, A Much-Needed Alternative to Youth Prisons, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2015,
5:07
PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/youth-prisonsb_7772722
[https://
perma.cc/AK72-5PU2].
335. RE-IMAGINE L.A. CouNTY, https://yesonj.reimagine.la [https://perma.cc/PQD7-S7PJ] ("Start
dismantling systemic racism by investing in health, housing, and economic justice. Let's
#reimaginela.").
336. Thanks to Carissa Hessick for this point.
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supports.
While some progressive prosecutors explicitly recognize that
investment in social infrastructure is the best long-term crime prevention
measure, they are not ceding control over their budgets or expressly advocating to
have public resources reallocated to institutions outside the criminal system.
Ceding power to the community, transformative justice, divesting from
prosecution, and investing in societal supports are all inextricably connected
actions and essential to downsizing and transforming the carceral state. Even
those prosecutors who are increasing community consultation and ramping up
societal support programs are not willing to cut budgets. Indeed, they are asking
for more money to conduct their "progressive" work. This refusal to cede material
resources calls into question their commitment to engaging in restorative
programs-are prosecutors truly recognizing community voice and expertise if
they insist on controlling the purse strings?
CONCLUSION: BEYOND LAWYERS

In returning to the question I asked at the opening of this Article, whether
progressive prosecutors, as opposed to courts and legislatures, are the best hope for
change, I need to add one more locus of change-the people themselves.
Progressive action is not enough to meaningfully change the criminal system.
Instead, only radical action can work, and lawyers are not by professional culture,
or perhaps nature, radical. Indeed, their ethical rules and training may make them
incapable of being so." As a result, social change mostly comes from beyond the
narrow confines of the legal system-including individual cases, appeals, and
impact litigation-and from community self-defense, organizing, and protest.338
This is a reckoning for lawyers: It goes against our professional culture to cede
expertise, to listen rather than talk, to follow rather than direct. This is true of legal
scholars, too. As Mari Matsuda has pointed out, scholars "should listen" to the
voices of marginalized people, and "build coalitions with others," since we "will
never be [at] the center of any successful [change] movement."339 All lawyers and
scholars, not just prosecutors, should allow the true change agents, those in the
system and those touched by it, to exercise their autonomy from the bottom up.

337.

See, e.g., Farbman, supra note 248, at 1927 (noting that the most ardently abolitionist lawyers
could not freely admit to, for instance, helping to facilitate escapes of enslaved persons, which
was at the time illegal).
338. I. Bennett Capers,Afrofuturism, CriticalRace Theory, andPolicingin the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 55 (2019) ("[S]ometimes it makes sense to 'keep the law at bay."').
339. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22 HARv.C.R.C.L. L. REV. 323, 324, 349 (1987).

238

69 UCLA L. REV. 164 (2022)

This does not mean there is no role for lawyers in transforming the carceral
state. We are part of the solution-but only a supporting role, not the lead.
Defenders and prosecutors both "are part of the pathway to the future we seek to
create. They are the start of how we reposition community, but they are not of
themselves the ultimate goal."" So, while communities will organize to help elect
prosecutors like Gascon in Los Angeles, they will never forget that all prosecutors
"remain part of an unjust system" and that it is not lawyers who will dismantle that
system and rebuild a better world. Rather, they themselves must keep striving
toward the horizon of a truly free and equal state."'

340. Jayadev & Weiss, supra note 21.
341. See also Levin, supra note 9 (quoting Black Lives Matter cofounder Melina Abdullah).

